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HOW SUPREME IS
THE SUPREME LAW OF THE LAND?
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE
INFLUENCE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS TREATIES UPON THE
INTERPRETATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL
TEXTS BY DOMESTIC COURTS
Yuval Shany*
We emphasize that it is American standards of decency that are dispositive . . . . While “the practices of other nations, particularly other democracies, can be relevant . . .” they cannot serve to establish the first
Eighth Amendment prerequisite, that the practice is accepted among
our people.1
The [Australian] Constitution is our fundamental law, not a collection
of principles amounting to the rights of man, to be read and approved
by people and institutions elsewhere. The approbation of nations does
not give our Constitution any force, nor does its absence deny it effect.
Such a consideration should, therefore, have no part to play in interpreting our basic law.2
The provisions of the Charter, though drawing on a political and social
philosophy shared with other democratic societies, are uniquely Canadian. As a result, considerations may point, as they do in this case, to a
conclusion regarding a rights violation which is not necessarily in accord with those international covenants.3

I

nternational human rights (IHR) law and constitutional law (CL)
share similar social functions and goals. Still, courts in a number of
influential legal systems, most notably in the United States, have long
resisted attempts to construe their constitutional texts in light of binding
IHR instruments. The Article explores the largely inadequate degree of
incorporation of IHR treaty norms in the CL of six common law countries (the United States, Canada, Australia, Israel, the United Kingdom,
* Hersch Lauterpacht Chair in Public International Law, Hebrew University, Jerusalem; Visiting Fellow, Human Rights Program, Harvard Law School (2003–2004). The
author thanks Prof. Frances Raday, Dr. Barak Medina, and the participants in the Harvard
Human Rights Program Visiting Fellows seminar for their useful comments and suggestions. Special thanks are due to Itzik Raviv, my research assistant.
1. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 n.1 (1989) (citations omitted).
2. Western Australia v. Ward (2002) 213 C.L.R. 1, 391 (Austl.) (Callinan, J., dissenting).
3. R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, 702 (Can.) (McLachlin, J., dissenting).
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and South Africa) and identifies the causes for judicial reluctance to incorporation. The Article then challenges the view that incorporation
could violate constitutional principles, introduce legal disharmony, and
raise cultural and political objections. It posits that numerous legal policy
considerations support incorporation at the constitutional level. Most importantly, it asserts that IHR law requires such incorporation.
I. INTRODUCTION
IHR norms bear great resemblance to many constitutional norms found
in the domestic constitutions of many nations. Both bodies of norms define and delimit the relations between the government and the governed,
protect comparable social and moral values of fundamental importance,
and transcend day-to-day legal and political processes (e.g., they are endowed with norm-entrenching features).4 In fact, the language of IHR
law often mirrors that of constitutional norms.5 Given their similar purpose, substance, and form, it is only natural to expect that the two bodies
of law will cross-fertilize each other, i.e., that international instruments
would be utilized to inform the interpretation and application of constitutional instruments6 and vice versa. International law may in fact compel
4. Cf. Gerald L. Neuman, Human Rights and Constitutional Rights: Harmony and
Dissonance, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1863, 1866–72 (2003) (identifying consent, suprapositivism and institutional aspects as three common features of constitutional and international
human rights norms).
5. See Louis Henkin, Rights: American and Human, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 405, 415
(1979) (“[M]ost of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and later the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, are in their essence American constitutional
rights projected around the world.”); Louis Henkin, Constitutionalism and Human Rights,
in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION ABROAD 383, 388 (Louis Henkin & Albert J. Rosenthal eds., 1990); Thomas Buergenthal, Self-Executing and Non-Self-Executing Treaties in National and International Law, in 235 RECUEIL DES COURS: COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 303, 392 (1992). See generally Anthony Lester, The Overseas
Trade in the American Bill of Rights, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 537 (1988).
6. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, International Human Rights Standards in National Law:
The Jurisprudence of the United States, in ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN
DOMESTIC COURTS 189, 198 (Benedetto Conforti & Francesco Francioni eds., 1997);
Gerald N. Neuman, The Uses of International Law in Constitutional Interpretation, 98
AM. J. INT’L L. 82, 84 (2004); Nadine Strossen, Recent U.S. and International Judicial
Protection of Individual Rights: A Comparative Legal Process Analysis and Proposed
Synthesis, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 807 (1990). The following passage by the High Court
of South Africa illustrates this point:
International law is particularly helpful in interpreting the Bill of Rights where
the Constitution uses language which is similar to that which has been used in
international instruments. The jurisprudence of the International Covenant on
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such interaction in order to guarantee effective implementation of IHR
norms.7
Alas, despite these hospitable background conditions, the actual relations between IHR and domestic CL8 have often been tenuous or nonextant.9 In a number of influential legal systems, most notably that of the
United States, there exists deeply imbedded resistance to the idea that
texts of a super-legislative nature, such as the Constitution, ought to be
construed in light of international law in general, and IHR law in particular10 (notwithstanding the reference in the U.S. Constitution to international treaties as “the supreme law of land”).11 Other jurisdictions have
tended to ignore the issue altogether, opting de facto for a nonincorporative regime.12
The Article discusses the judicial reluctance to incorporate IHR treaties
into CL and criticizes the principal objections to incorporation raised by
courts and academics. Furthermore, it presents a host of arguments in
favor of applying IHR law as an influential interpretive tool, which
should inform the contents of domestic CL. In particular, it argues first
that IHR treaties require states to integrate IHR law into all facets of do-

Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which is plainly the model for parts of
our Bill of Rights, is an example of this. It assists in understanding the nature of
the duties placed on the State (including the Council) by section 7 of the Constitution.
Residents of Bon Vista Mansions v S. Metro. Local Council 2002 (6) BCLR 625 (W)
para. 15.
7. This idea is encapsulated by the pacta sunt servanda principle enshrined in customary international law and in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26,
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) [hereinafter VCLT].
8. In the United States, CL has sometimes been defined as: “1. The body of law
deriving from the U.S. Constitution and dealing primarily with governmental powers,
civil rights, and civil liberties. 2. The body of legal rules that determine the constitution
of a state with an [sic] flexible constitution.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 307 (7th ed.
1999). In this article, CL comprises the body of law governing the application and interpretation of supra-legislative instruments, such as constitutions, basic law, and other instruments allowing national courts to review the validity of primary legislative instruments. Other legal functions of CL (such as the interpretation of secondary legislation,
regulation of the method of operation of government institutions, etc.) will be excluded
from the purview of discussion.
9. See Roger P. Alford, Federal Courts, International Tribunals, and the Continuum
of Deference, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 675, 774 (2003) (“[T]he experiment of judicial internalization of international ideals through constitutional interpretation has failed.”).
10. See infra Part IV.C.1.
11. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
12. See discussion below on the legal situation in Israel and, to a lesser degree, on the
situation in the United Kingdom.
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mestic law. A state’s failure to integrate IHR law into CL might thus lead
to a breach of its international obligations. Second, a host of substantive
moral, social, and legal policy considerations support, even from a domestic law perspective, the need to increase the influence of constitutional-like IHR norms upon CL.13
Consequently, the Article posits that binding IHR treaties should always be considered by courts in CL cases and that CL ought to be construed, if possible, as consistent with such treaty norms (although lack of
ability to harmonize might result in international liability). This approach
promotes the incorporation of IHR into domestic CL while preserving a
healthy degree of judicial discretion as to the scope and pace of integration. It therefore facilitates the adaptation of international norms to the
particularities of domestic legal systems and strikes a balance between
competing legal and policy considerations. By contrast, the failure to
apply IHR law at the constitutional level has severe adverse implications.
Rejection of IHR law’s relevance to the CL discourse results in the exclusion of IHR from crucial legal debates pertaining to the judicial review of legislation, the structuring of social institutions, and the definition and realization of fundamental social tenets, values, and interests.
This renders IHR law powerless to challenge deeply imbedded objections to the values it purports to defend.
Hopefully, the work presented here will contribute to a better understanding of the international obligation to incorporate IHR into CL and
the various challenges and jurisprudential problems associated with such
incorporation. Recognition of the similar nature of the objections raised
in different jurisdictions could also advance a comparative analysis of the
contested issues and stimulate cross-fertilization across national borders.
Although there is a considerable body of literature focusing upon the role
of international law within national law and upon constitutional methods
of interpretation in specific jurisdictions,14 little has been written on the
topic from a de-localized or international perspective. The present Article
aims to fill this void.
Part II of the Article discusses the question of incorporation from an
international law perspective and analyzes the relevant incorporation ob13. Neuman, supra note 6, at 85 (“The prominence of this suprapositive aspect distinguishes human rights law from many other fields of positive law.”).
14. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL LAW DECISIONS IN NATIONAL COURTS (Thomas M.
Franck & Gregory H. Fox eds., 1996); ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN
DOMESTIC COURTS, supra note 6; WALTER F. MURPHY ET AL., AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (3d ed. 2003); CRAIG R. DUCAT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (7th ed. 2000); CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (Susan J. Brisson & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong eds., 1993).
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ligations introduced by the main IHR treaties. Part III undertakes a short
discussion of various techniques for incorporating IHR law into CL and
argues that a number of common law countries fail to meet the required
international standard of incorporation. Part IV identifies the main objections raised, explicitly and implicitly, by domestic judges and academics
against enhancing the role of IHR treaties within the CL discourse. These
objections are critically examined and counter-arguments are presented.
The final segment of the Article concludes that interpreting constitutional
texts in light of IHR treaties is, generally speaking, good law and good
policy.
Before embarking on a substantive review of relevant law and policy,
two methodological comments should be made. First, the focus below is
on one category of positive IHR law—validly ratified IHR treaties. The
more complicated issue of the domestic effect of customary IHR law is
dealt with only incidentally.15 The treaties’ precise language, the extensive practice of international bodies in construing them, and the manifest
consent to their binding effect on the part of ratifying states, facilitate
incorporation and remove objections which could be directed against
customary law—primarily, normative ambiguity and questionable legitimacy.16 Of course, doctrinal assertions developed with respect to the
domestic status of IHR treaties would also have implications for the
status of customary law.
Second, the Article focuses primarily upon the law and practice of a
limited number of common law countries. Not only are legal materials
from the selected countries more accessible to the present writer, but
there is also considerable evidence that the problems identified in this
Article are more acute in common law than in civil law jurisdictions.17
This can be attributed, inter alia, to the dualist traditions of many common law countries18 and, at least in some cases, to the limited historical
15. For a discussion on the interpretive role of international customary law, see Tamela R. Hughlett, Comment, International Law: The Use of International Law as a Guide
to Interpretation of the United States Constitution, 45 OKLA. L. REV. 169, 183–84 (1992).
16. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal
Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 858–59
(1997); Hughlett, supra note 15, at 184 (“The more specific the international norm, the
more useful it becomes as a guide for constitutional interpretation.”).
17. See, e.g., Jörg Polakiewicz & Valérie Jacob-Foltzer, The European Human Rights
Convention in Domestic Law: The Impact of Strasbourg Case-Law in States Where Direct Effect is Given to the Convention, 12 HUM. RTS. L.J. 125 (1991) (conducting a comprehensive survey of the incorporation of the European Human Rights Convention in the
internal law of numerous civil law countries).
18. Although it is sometimes believed that civil law countries tend to be monists,
while common law countries lean towards dualism, in reality many legal systems have
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influence of IHR standards on the creation of their constitutional instruments.19 It is in encouraging debate in these common law legal systems
that the Article can hope to be most useful.20

opted for a mixed regime containing monist and dualist elements. For example, in England and in other countries sharing its legal tradition, such as Canada and Israel, customary international law is automatically part of the law of the land. See, e.g., Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, [1977] 1 Q.B. 529 (U.K.); CrimA 474/54
Shtampfer v. Attorney-General, [1956] IsrSC 10 5 (Isr.). However, treaties do not have
any formal legal status until incorporated. In contrast, the U.S. Constitution regards international treaties as the “supreme Law of the Land,” U.S. CONST. art.VI, cl. 2, and U.S.
courts have held customary international law to be part of the law of the land.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 1 reporters’
note 5 (1987) (“The courts have held that other international agreements and federal determinations and interpretations of customary international law are also supreme over
State law.”). Nevertheless, this monist veneer is misleading, as judge-made distinctions
between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties have diminished the monist disposition of U.S. law and have led courts to treat many treaties—especially IHR treaties—
under a de facto dualistic paradigm. See Foster v. Nielson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829); Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT’L L.
695 (1995); Richard B. Lillich, The United States Constitution and International Human
Rights Law, 3 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 53, 62–69 (1990); Buergenthal, supra note 5, at 368–
82; John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the
Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1969–73 (1999). Reluctance to apply
customary law by U.S. courts and theoretical challenges to its applicability at the federal
level have brought about a similar outcome with regard to customary norms. See Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 622 F. Supp. 887, 903 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (“[T]he President has the
authority to ignore our country’s obligations arising under customary international law
. . . .”). See also Henkin, supra note 6, at 192; Gordon A. Christenson, Problems of Proving International Human Rights Law in the U.S. Courts: Customary International Human
Rights Law in Domestic Court Decisions, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 225, 232–41
(1996); Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 852–53 (observing that 19th century
judicial precedents declaring customary international law to be part of the federal common law have been rendered obsolete by the famous Supreme Court decision in Erie R.R.
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), which ruled out the existence of a federal common
law). But see Lillich, supra, at 69–71.
19. Both the U.S. and the Australian Constitutions predate the creation of the IHR
movement. At the same time, the United Kingdom and Israel have no comprehensive
constitutions and the limited scope of their constitutional texts left little room for interaction with IHR norms.
20. Similarities in legal thinking and conceptualization, combined with cultural and
political affinities, make the mutual experience of common law countries perhaps more
relevant and persuasive to one another. See, e.g., Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 997
(1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court has found particularly instructive opinions
of former Commonwealth nations insofar as those opinions reflect a legal tradition that
also underlies our own Eighth Amendment.”).
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II. THE OBLIGATION TO INCORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES INTO
DOMESTIC LAW: DOES IT APPLY TO CONSTITUTIONAL LAW?
The nature of the duty to incorporate international norms into domestic
law that arises from IHR treaties, such as the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)21 or the European Convention on
Human Rights (European HR Convention),22 has been the subject of extensive consideration. The conservative view adopted by influential
scholars23 and human rights bodies24 is that the treaties do not introduce a
duty to incorporate human rights by way of specific legislation, and that
states have a wide margin of discretion in determining how to give effect
to their treaty obligations in this area.25 This approach, which mirrors the
21. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Exec. Doc.
E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
22. Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter European HR Convention].
23. See MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR
COMMENTARY 53–54 (1993); Oscar Schachter, The Obligation to Implement the Covenant in Domestic Law, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL
AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 311, 313–14 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981); Henkin, Constitutionalism, supra note 5, at 395; MATHEW C. R. CRAVEN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 125 (1995); Rebecca J. Cook, State Responsibility for Violations of Women’s Human Rights, 7 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 125, 161 (1994);
Neuman, supra note 6, at 84.
24. See, e.g., General Comment 3: Article 2: Implementation at the National Level,
para. 1, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., 13th Sess., in COMPILATION OF GENERAL COMMENTS
AND GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY BODIES, U.N.
Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1, at 4 (1994) [hereinafter HRC General Comment 3] (“The Committee notes that article 2 of the Covenant generally leaves it to the States parties concerned to choose their method of implementation in their territories within the framework
set out in that article.”); General Comment 3: The Nature of States Parties Obligations
(art. 2, para. 1 of the Covenant), para. 4, U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., 5th
Sess., in COMPILATION OF GENERAL COMMENTS AND GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS
ADOPTED BY HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY BODIES, supra, at 45 [hereinafter CESCR General
Comment 3] (“[E]ach State party must decide for itself which means are the most appropriate under the circumstances with respect to each of the rights . . . .”); General Comment 9: The Domestic Application of the Covenant, para. 5, U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc.
& Cultural Rts., 19th Sess., 51st mtg., U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1998/24 (1998) [hereinafter
CESCR General Comment 9] (“[T]he precise method by which Covenant rights are given
effect in national law is a matter for each State party to decide . . . .”); Lithgow v. United
Kingdom, 8 Eur. H.R. Rep. 328, 397 (1986) (“[T]here is thus no obligation to incorporate
the Convention into domestic law, by virtue of Article 1 of the Convention . . . .”).
25. However, this margin of discretion is reviewable by international monitoring
bodies. See CESCR General Comment 3, supra note 24, para. 4 (“[T]he ultimate determination as to whether all appropriate measures have been taken remains one for the
Committee to make.”); CRAVEN, supra note 23, at 125.
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general attitude towards international obligations of result,26 is supported
by a number of policy considerations. Flexibility in incorporation strategies defers to the states’ superior ability to determine how best to implement treaty obligations within the framework of domestic law-making
procedures and constitutional constraints. It also marks respect for the
sovereignty of the state over the law applicable in its territory and deference to diversity in domestic legal arrangements employed by states participating in IHR treaties. The language of article 2(2) of the ICCPR supports this flexible position:
Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the
necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes and
with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such legislative or
other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant.27

Similar discretionary language can be identified in the other global
IHR treaties28 and the European HR Convention.29 However, as the fol26. See International Law Commission, Commentaries to the Draft Articles on the
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 12, U.N. Doc. A/56/10
(Nov. 2001); Henkin, supra note 6, at 189–90.
27. ICCPR, supra note 21, art. 2(2) (emphasis added).
28. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 2(1),
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR] (“Each State Party to the present
Covenant undertakes to take steps . . . to the maximum of its available resources, with a
view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present
Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative
measures.”) (emphasis added); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination art. 2(1)(d), opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. C,
95-2 (1978), 660 U.N.T.S. 212 [hereinafter CERD] (“Each State Party shall prohibit and
bring to an end, by all appropriate means, including legislation as required by circumstances, racial discrimination by any persons, group or organization . . . .”) (emphasis
added); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
art. 24, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter CEDAW] (“States Parties undertake to adopt all necessary measures at the national level aimed at achieving the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Convention.”); Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 2(1), adopted
Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT]
(“Each State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction.”); Convention on the
Rights of the Child art. 4, adopted Nov. 20, 1989, 144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter CRC]
(“States Parties shall undertake all appropriate legislative, administrative, and other
measures for the implementation of the rights recognized in the present Convention.”)
(emphasis added).
29. European HR Convention, supra note 22, art. 1 (“The High Contracting Parties
shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Sec-
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lowing paragraphs indicate, a closer look at the language of IHR treaties
in light of their context, object, and purpose, challenges the accuracy of
the conservative approach towards incorporation.
Any discussion on the nature of the incorporation obligations introduced by IHR treaties should first acknowledge the principles that treaty
obligations must be performed in good faith30 and that states are unable
to rely upon domestic law to justify failures to fulfill their international
obligations.31 These principles support the proposition that failure to incorporate IHR treaties into domestic law, including CL, could, in theory,
be viewed as a violation of international law if a good faith reading of the
treaties so requires.
Another relevant principle is that of effective interpretation (“effet
utile”), which supports reading international treaties in a manner designed to give effect to their provisions.32 In the context of IHR treaties,
there can be little doubt that enforcement of IHR norms through domestic courts could be far more effective than methods of enforcement available at the international level (e.g., through treaty bodies such as United
Nations (UN) Committees, or inter-state communications), which are
less accessible to individual victims and less likely to generate compliance by the state in question (note that the decisions of UN treaty bodies

tion I of this Convention.”). See also Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 2, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123
[hereinafter I/A CHR] (“Where the exercise of any of the rights or freedoms referred to in
Article 1 is not already ensured by legislative or other provisions, the States Parties undertake to adopt, in accordance with their constitutional processes and the provisions of
this Convention, such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to
those rights or freedoms.”); Organization of African Unity, Banjul Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights art. 1, June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) (“The Member States of the
Organization of African Unity parties to the present Charter shall recognize the rights,
duties and freedoms enshrined in this Chapter and shall undertake to adopt legislative or
other measures to give effect to them.”).
30. VCLT, supra note 7, art. 26. The customary status of most of the provisions of the
VCLT is widely acknowledged. See, e.g., Chubb & Son, Inc. v. Asiana Airlines, 214 F.3d
301, 308 (2d Cir. 2000) (“According to a widespread legal conviction of the international
community, the Vienna Convention is largely a restatement of customary rules . . . .”).
31. VCLT, supra note 7, art. 27.
32. See, e.g., Loizidou v. Turkey, 20 Eur. H.R. Rep. 99, 133 (1995) (Preliminary Objections) (“[T]he object and purpose of the Convention as an instrument for the protection
of individual human beings require that its provisions be interpreted and applied so as to
make its safeguards practical and effective.”); Prosecutor v. Delali, Case No. IT-96-21-T,
Judgment, para. 170 (Nov. 16, 1998) (“The interpretation of the provisions of the Statute
and Rules must, therefore, take into consideration the objects of the Statute and the social
and political considerations which gave rise to its creation.”).
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are not even legally binding).33 The weakness of the inter-state formal
and informal enforcement mechanisms existing under UN treaties highlights the advantages of domestic fora.34 Indeed, domestic courts in democracies committed to the rule of law often function as the most accessible and effective human rights enforcers.35 This is because the familiarity of such courts with local conditions facilitates the issuance of politically acceptable decisions; further, their judgments are routinely enforced by the executive branch, and proceedings before them are widely
perceived as legitimate.36
The involvement of domestic courts also has important long-term educational and preventive effects. While the record of many domestic
courts in upholding IHR law is far from perfect, even in well-respected
democracies, their role as a first instance forum for airing human rights
grievances is indispensable. However, domestic procedures could be
deemed effective from an IHR law perspective only if individuals are
able to invoke before municipal courts legal norms which correspond to
their internationally recognized human rights. Hence, incorporation of
IHR standards into domestic law (directly or through elaboration of
analogous domestic standards) goes a significant way towards ensuring
their effectiveness.
The centrality of domestic enforcement of IHR law is underscored by
the right to effective remedy enumerated in a number of IHR treaties. For
example, article 2(3) of the ICCPR provides:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes: (a) To ensure that
any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated

33. See, e.g., Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights art. 5(4), Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302, 6 I.L.M. 368 [hereinafter ICCPR OP
I]; J. S. Davidson, Intention and Effect: The Legal Status of the Final Views of the Human
Rights Committee, 2001 N.Z. L. REV. 125, 127–28 (2001).
34. See Rosalyn Higgins, The Role of Domestic Courts in the Enforcement of International Human Rights: The United Kingdom, in ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS IN DOMESTIC COURTS, supra note 6, at 37, 38. Cf. Reservations to the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951
I.C.J. 15, 23 (“[I]n a convention of this type one cannot speak of individual advantages or
disadvantages to States . . . .”).
35. Karen Knop, Here and There: International Law in Domestic Courts, 32 N.Y.U.
J. INT’L L. & POL. 501, 516 (2000) (“Domestic courts seem the best hope for putting international law into action.”).
36. Cf. Louis Henkin, Introduction, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra
note 23, at 1, 14 (observing that, when national institutions fail to provide human rights,
international institutions “can only press the state to do so”); Jack Goldsmith, Should
International Human Rights Law Trump US Domestic Law?, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 327, 334
(2000).
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shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has
been committed by persons acting in an official capacity; (b) To ensure
that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy; (c)
To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies
when granted.37

Similar effective remedy clauses can be found in the texts of other IHR
treaties38 and in other instruments related to the work of international

37. ICCPR, supra note 21, art. 2(3) (emphasis added). There is some confusion regarding the necessary sequence of events under article 2(3) of the ICCPR. The earlier
case law of the Human Rights Committee (HRC) supported the proposition that the application of the “effective remedy” provision depends upon an initial finding that a violation took place. See, e.g., Mbenge v. Zaire, Commc’n No. 16/1977, para. 18, U.N. Hum.
Rts. Comm., 18th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/18/D/16/1977 (1983). For criticism, see
NOWAK, supra note 23, at 62. However, more recent case law has adopted a more flexible
approach. See Kazantzis v. Cyprus, Commc’n No. 972/2001, para. 6.6, U.N. Hum. Rts.
Comm., 78th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/972/2001 (2003) (“[A]rticle 2, paragraph 3,
provides protection to alleged victims if their claims are sufficiently well-founded to be
arguable under the Covenant.”).
38. See, e.g., European HR Convention, supra note 22, art. 13 (“Everyone whose
rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective
remedy before a national authority . . . .”); CERD, supra note 28, art. 6 (“States Parties
shall assure to everyone within their jurisdiction effective protection and remedies,
through the competent national tribunals and other State institutions, against any acts of
racial discrimination which violate his human rights and fundamental freedoms contrary
to this Convention . . . .”); CAT, supra note 28, art. 2(1) (“Each State Party shall take
effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in
any territory under its jurisdiction.”) (emphasis added); J. HERMAN BURGERS & HANS
DANELIUS, THE UNTIED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE: A HANDBOOK ON THE
CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN AND DEGRADING
PUNISHMENT 123 (1988); AHCENE BOULESBAA, THE U.N. CONVENTION ON TORTURE AND
THE PROSPECTS FOR ENFORCEMENT 58 (1999). See also Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 8, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810
(Dec. 10, 1948) (“Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution
or by law.”). Note that this last affirmation of the right to effective remedy might pertain
only to incorporated human rights. The right to effective remedy is also consistent with
the obligation to exhaust domestic remedies before resorting to international litigation
under IHR compliance mechanisms. See, e.g., ICCPR OP I, supra note 33, art. 2. Such an
obligation (which applies with regard to individual complainants and states exercising
diplomatic protection) assumes that the allegedly violating state should attempt to offer
adequate solutions to the problem through its domestic legal procedures. Cf. Anne F.
Bayefsky, International Human Rights Law in Canadian Court, in ENFORCING
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN DOMESTIC COURTS, supra note 6, at 295, 296.
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treaty bodies.39 It is difficult to see how these provisions can be met
without incorporation into domestic law of the substantive primary
rights, underlying the “second order” right to remedy.40 In addition, a
number of treaty provisions, including article 2(1) of the ICCPR, refer to
standards of necessity or propriety to gauge the lawfulness of the incorporation strategy adopted by the state in question.41 This also supports an
effectiveness-enhancing interpretation of the implementation provisions
found in IHR treaties.
Finally, key IHR treaties require states to “ensure” or “secure” the
rights and freedoms enumerated therein.42 This requirement has been
construed in the practice of international courts and tribunals and some
of the relevant literature as entailing an obligation placed upon states to
take positive measures to facilitate implementation of human rights and
prevent violations of those human rights by private individuals and other
non-state actors.43 An additional measure which might be required in
order to “ensure” the implementation of IHR treaties is to notify individuals of the rights accrued to them under the treaties.44 This combination of conditions and requirements seriously limits the margin of discre39. The ICESCR does not contain an “effective remedy” clause. Still, the CESCR
Committee has held that the principle is part of the general corpus of IHR law. CESCR
General Comment 9, supra note 24, para. 3.
40. For a division between “first order” and “second order” rights, endowed with an
individuating operative function, see JOSEPH RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM 155
(2d ed. 1980).
41. See ICESCR, supra note 28, art. 2(1); CERD, supra note 28, art. 2(1)(d);
CEDAW, supra note 28, art. 24; CRC, supra note 28, art. 4; Schachter, supra note 23, at
319–20; NOWAK, supra note 23, at 37.
42. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 21, art. 2(1); European HR Convention, supra note
22, art. 1; I/A CHR, supra note 29, art. 1; International Convention on the Protection of
the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, G.A. Res. 45/158,
art. 7, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 49A, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (1990).
43. HRC General Comment 3, supra note 24, para. 1 (“[States’] obligation . . . is not
confined to the respect of human rights, but . . . States parties have also undertaken to
ensure the enjoyment of these rights to all individuals under their jurisdiction. This aspect
calls for specific activities by the States parties to enable individuals to enjoy their
rights.”) (emphasis added); General Comment No. 28: Equality of Rights Between Men
and Women (Article 3), para. 2, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., 68th Sess., U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10 (2000) (providing that states shall undertake steps to remove
“obstacles to the equal enjoyment” of rights); Thomas Buergenthal, To Respect and to
Ensure: State Obligations and Permissible Derogations, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 23, at 72, 77.
44. HRC General Comment 3, supra note 24, para. 2 (“[I]t is very important that
individuals should know what their rights under the Covenant (and the Optional Protocol,
as the case may be) are and also that all administrative and judicial authorities should be
aware of the obligations which the State party has assumed under the Covenant.”).
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tion granted to states in deciding how to incorporate IHR into their domestic system. Incorporation must be appropriate and effective. Hence, it
must enable individuals to approach domestic courts in the event of a
breach of IHR treaty norms, a process that must lead to an enforceable
remedy.
These general policy considerations apply with special force to some
specific norms and principles of IHR law that have been identified by the
treaties themselves, the treaty bodies, and scholars as necessitating explicit incorporation. Consider, for example, article 20 of the ICCPR,
which requires specific legislation prohibiting incitement to racism, and
article 4 of the CAT, which requires a specific criminal prohibition
against torture.45 In the same vein, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights opined that anti-discriminatory policies as well
as policies in the field of health and education should be backed up by
proper legislation.46 More generally, it has been argued that legislation is
indispensable in order to apply IHR norms to relations between private
individuals (e.g., in the area of labor relations), to override inconsistent
legislation, or to remedy situations where non-legislative measures have
been proven ineffective.47 Hence, while states have some discretion as to
the method and perhaps also the pace of legislative reform (e.g., whether
to rely upon existing law and buttress it with an interpretive presumption
or to enact new statutory instruments),48 they are obliged to ultimately

45. ICCPR, supra note 21, art. 2; CAT, supra note 28, art. 4. Other treaty clauses that
incorporate an explicit or implicit obligation to legislate are ICCPR, supra note 21, arts.
6, 17, 26; ICESCR, supra note 28, art. 10(3); CERD, supra note 28, art. 4; CEDAW,
supra note 28, art. 2; CAT, supra, art. 14(1); CRC, supra note 28, arts. 16(2), 32; European HR Convention, supra note 22, art. 2; Protocol No. 7 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 2, Nov. 22, 1984, E.T.S. 117.
46. In relevant part, the Committee’s comment reads:
The Committee recognizes that in many instances legislation is highly desirable
and in some cases may even be indispensable. For example, it may be difficult
to combat discrimination effectively in the absence of a sound legislative foundation for the necessary measures. In fields such as health, the protection of
children and mothers, and education, as well as in respect of the matters dealt
with in articles 6 to 9, legislation may also be an indispensable element for
many purposes.
CESCR General Comment 3, supra note 24, para. 3. See also CESCR General Comment
9, supra note 24, para. 9; General Comment No. 5: Persons with Disabilities, para.16,
U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., 11th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1994/13
(1994).
47. CRAVEN, supra note 23, at 126.
48. See discussion in Schachter, supra note 23, at 320.
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bring their domestic laws into full compliance with the IHR treaties to
which they are a party.
The need to incorporate IHR law into domestic legislation through one
or another means finds support in the case law and periodic reports of the
UN treaty bodies49 and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).
In Lithgow, the ECtHR held:
Although there is thus no obligation to incorporate the Convention into
domestic law, by virtue of Article 1 of the Convention the substance of
the rights and freedoms set forth must be secured under the domestic
legal order, in some form or another, to everyone within the jurisdiction
of the Contracting States . . . . 50

The argument regarding the need for incorporation applies with extra
force at the CL level. As human rights violations are often the product of
domestic legislation,51 an incorporation strategy which fails to offer adequate constitutional remedies might be viewed as inappropriate and ineffective. Further, the obligation to ensure compliance with human rights
standards or to secure their realization also applies with respect to constitutional norms because these norms might themselves be amenable to an
interpretation that is incompatible with IHR law.52 If courts are unable or
unwilling to rectify this impediment through interpretative means, they
might perpetuate their state’s failure to comply with its international obligations. Finally, it is questionable whether CL that fails to incorporate
IHR in a meaningful manner can “ensure” future implementation, i.e.,
provide human rights the necessary degree of security and protection

49. CESCR General Comment 9, supra note 24, para. 8 (“[T]he Committee strongly
encourages formal adoption or incorporation of the Covenant in national law.”); Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland—Dependent Territories, para. 11, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural
Rts., 28th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.79 (2002).
50. Lithgow v. United Kingdom, 8 Eur. H.R. Rep. 328, 397 (1986). For a discussion
of the duty to incorporate the European HR Convention, see ANDREW Z. DRZEMCZEWSKI,
EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTION IN DOMESTIC LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 40–
53 (1983).
51. For example, see Toonen v. Australia, Commc’n 488/1992, U.N. Hum. Rts.
Comm., 50th Sess., U.N. Doc CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (1994), in which Tasmania’s
Criminal Code was challenged as violative of the ICCPR because it criminalized various
forms of sexual contact between men, including all forms of sexual contact between consenting adult homosexual men in private. Indeed, a number of IHR treaties require states
to repeal legislation inconsistent with their provisions. See, e.g., CERD, supra note 28,
art. 2(1)(c).
52. See Neuman, supra note 6, at 85.
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from future legislative encroachment.53 Consequently, an incorporation
strategy that stops at the CL level cannot be deemed fully effective54 and
might even be considered an independent violation of the IHR obligations of the relevant state.55 Of course, states have considerable discretion in deciding how to incorporate IHR treaties at this level. They may
resort to direct incorporation, interpretation strategies, or any other
method of indirect incorporation. However, in my view, this margin of
discretion does not include the right to ignore the application of IHR
treaties when construing CL.56

53. See DRZEMCZEWSKI, supra note 50, at 4; Schachter, supra note 23, at 329–30.
54. For some support, consider the following passage:
The Committee notes with regret that, although some rights provided for in the
Covenant are legally protected and promoted through the Basic Laws, municipal laws, and the jurisprudence of the courts, the Covenant has not been incorporated in Israeli law and cannot be directly invoked in the courts. It recommends early action in respect of recent legislative initiatives aimed at enhancing the enjoyment of a number of the rights provided for in the Covenant, including proposals for new draft Basic Laws on due process rights and on freedom of expression and association. It also recommends that consideration be
given to enacting further laws to give effect to any rights not already covered
by Basic Laws.
Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Israel, para. 9, U.N. Hum.
Rts. Comm., 63d Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.93 (Aug. 18, 1998) (emphasis
added).
55. See Laura Dalton, Note, Stanford v. Kentucky and Wilkins v. Missouri: A Violation of an Emerging Rule of Customary International Law, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 161,
204 (1990) (arguing that failure by courts to consider IHR law in analyzing the constitutionality of a measure is in itself a violation of customary international law).
56. A parallel argument has been advanced by the Supreme Court of India:
These international instruments cast an obligation on the Indian State to gender
sensitise its laws and the Courts are under an obligation to see that the message
of the international instruments is not allowed to be drowned. This Court has in
numerous cases emphasized that while discussing constitutional requirements,
Court and counsel must never forget the core principle embodied in the international conventions and Instruments and as far as possible give effects to the
principles contained in those international instruments. The courts are under an
obligation to give due regard to international Conventions and Norms for construing domestic laws more so when there is no inconsistency between them
and there is a void in domestic law.
Apparel Export Promotion Council v. Chopra, A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 625, para. 27, available
at http://orissagov.nic.in/wcd/pdf/judgement1.pdf.
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III. THE PRACTICE OF INCORPORATING HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES INTO
DOMESTIC CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Having established the existence of an international obligation to harmonize IHR treaties and domestic CL, this Part turns to examine, by way
of comparative analysis, incorporation strategies adopted by six common
law countries: the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia,
South Africa and Israel.57 These strategies will be situated on a spectrum
of possible incorporation techniques ranging from explicit incorporation,
facilitating the constitutional status of IHR treaties, to discretionary reliance on IHR treaties by judges that construe domestic CL. On the basis
of this comparative analysis, this Part argues that, with the possible exception of Canada, the incorporation strategies adopted by the surveyed
countries fall short of the international standard identified in Part II. Finally, this Part suggests a variety of reasons which underlie states’ preferences for different incorporation strategies.
A. Possible Techniques for Incorporating International Law into
Constitutional Law
1. Explicit Incorporation
Several legal techniques could endow IHR treaty norms with constitutional status, which entails, at least in some cases, the power to override
ordinary legislation. The first and most straightforward method of incorporation is by way of an explicit constitutional provision specifying the
constitutional status of international law in general, or IHR treaties in
particular. Such specification could entail three alternative CL regimes:
a) supra-constitutionalism, whereby international law overrides constitutional instruments;58 b) constitutionalization, whereby international law
has a status equivalent to the constitution or similarly binding constitu-

57. It should be noted that even countries lacking a constitution, such as the United
Kingdom, have legal mechanisms designed to review the lawfulness or propriety of primary legislation. See Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, §§ 4, 10; Ex parte Factortame Ltd.,
[1991] 1 A.C. 603, 659.
58. This is essentially the status of European Community (EC) law—which includes
several human rights norms—in most EC countries. See Case 6/64, Costa v. E.N.E.L.,
1964 E.C.R. 585; Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft GmbH v. Einfuhr- und
Vorratsstelle fur Getreide und Futtermittel, 1970 E.C.R. 1125; Case 106/77, Amministrazione Delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal SpA, 1978 E.C.R. 629. To the extent that
state constitutions in the United States are subject to federal law, one could also view the
status of international treaties in the United States as supra-constitutional.
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tional instruments;59 or c) quasi-constitutionalization, whereby international law overrides ordinary legislation but is subject to constitutional
limits found in the constitution.60 When viewed from an IHR perspective,
all three methods of direct incorporation are highly desirable as they underline the direct effect and relative supremacy of IHR treaties. Many
legal systems around the world, however, including all of the surveyed
common law countries,61 have refrained from incorporating IHR treaties
into their constitutional instrument as directly enforceable norms.62
59. See, for example, the status of the European HR Convention in Austria, BundesVerfassungsgesetz [B-VG] [Constitution] BGBl I No. 1/1930, as amended by BGBl No.
59/1964 (Austria). See also Holly Jarmul, The Effect of Decisions of Regional Human
Rights Tribunals on National Courts, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 311, 334 (1996) (discussing the status of the European HR Convention as constitutional law). See also the
status of various IHR Treaties under the 1994 amendment to the Argentine Constitution,
ARG. CONST. art. 75, cl. 22.
60. See, e.g., Bruno Simma et al., The Role of German Courts in the Enforcement of
International Human Rights, in ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN DOMESTIC
COURTS, supra note 6, at 71, 89–92; Rett R. Ludwikowski, Supreme Law or Basic Law?
The Decline of the Concept of Constitutional Supremacy, 9 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L.
253, 283–84 (2001) (discussing the status of international law in France); COSTA RICA
CONST. art. 7; INSTRUMENT OF GOVERNMENT, 1974 [Constitution] ch. 2, art. 23 (Swed.)
(providing that the European HR Convention may not be contravened by ordinary laws);
RUSS. FED’N CONST. art. 15, § 4; CZECH REP. CONST. art. 10; SLOVK. CONST. art. 7, § 4;
BULG. CONST. art. 5; Grondwet voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden [GW] [Constitution] art. 94 (Neth.) (however, in reality, Dutch courts do not exercise constitutional review over treaties); Buergenthal, supra note 5, at 352–53 (discussing the scope of treaty
supremacy in the Netherlands); Ryan Goodman, Human Rights Treaties, Invalid Reservations, and State Consent, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 531, 541, 547–48 (2002) (discussing new
democracies in Eastern Europe and the system of the Nordic countries and the Netherlands). Under German law, only customary law enjoys a super-legislative status. See
Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (federal constitution) GG art. 25 (providing that general rules of international law take precedence over ordinary legislation).
The courts of several other civil law systems have opted for the quasi-constitutionalist
model, endowing treaties with super-statutory status, without explicit constitutional authorizations. This is for example the law in France, Belgium and Argentina. Buergenthal,
supra note 5, at 347–49, 358.
61. Even the UK Human Rights Act, 1998, which could qualify as a quasiconstitutional instrument, does not involve direct incorporation of European HR Convention rights. STEPHEN GROSZ, JACK BEATSON & PETER DUFFY, HUMAN RIGHTS: THE 1998
ACT AND THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION 8–9 (2000).
62. For example, in the United States, treaties enjoy a status similar to federal legislation, and in the event of conflict between treaties and the Constitution, the latter prevails.
De Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16–17
(1957). See also Peter J. Spiro, Treaties, International Law, and Constitutional Rights, 55
STAN. L. REV. 1999, 2004 (2003); Buergenthal, supra note 5, at 344; Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1562–63 (1984).
However, IHR treaties have been viewed by U.S. courts as non-self-executing, thereby
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Two caveats to the last observation could be noted. First, some of the
surveyed countries include CL norms whose contents mirror IHR treaty
norms. Thus, some of the older CL norms, like the U.S. Constitution,
have influenced the contents of IHR treaties,63 while modern CL norms
have been inspired by IHR law.64 Obviously, similarity in the language
of CL instruments and IHR treaties reduces the need for explicit incorpobarring direct reliance upon their provisions in domestic proceedings. Buergenthal, supra
note 5, at 370–82. Another factor mitigating the relevance of IHR treaties to U.S. CL is
the reluctance of the United States to ratify human rights treaties and its practice of introducing generous reservations into the treaties it has ratified. See, e.g., Declarations and
Reservations of the United States upon Ratification of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, June 8, 1992, 1992 U.N.T.S. 543, reprinted in United States:
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Report on the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, 31 I.L.M. 645 (1992), available at http://untreaty.un.org/
humanrightsconvs/chapt_IV_4/ reservations/USA.pdf. Still, there is room to argue that
IHR treaties might have relevance for American CL as some norms are not covered by
treaty reservations, some non-ratified treaties arguably reflect customary international
law (and should therefore apply regardless of the reservations entered by the United
States), and the validity of some of the reservations introduced is questionable. See, e.g.,
General Comment No. 24: Issues Relating to Reservations Made upon Ratification or
Accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols Thereto, or in Relation to Declarations Under Article 41 of the Covenant, para. 19, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., 52nd Sess.,
U.N Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (1994); Elena A. Baylis, General Comment 24: Confronting the Problem of Reservations to Human Rights Treaties, 17 BERKELEY J. INT’L L.
277 (1999); Henkin, supra note 6, at 196–97. Furthermore, some of the reservations introduced by the United States are of a circular nature: they refer to the U.S. Constitution
for delineation of the scope of the international obligation assumed by the U.S. and yet do
not bar the U.S. judiciary from relying upon the treaty texts when construing these same
constitutional standards. See Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (11th Cir. 1986). See
also Henkin, supra note 6, at 194–200; Natasha Fain, Human Rights Within the United
States: The Erosion of Confidence, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 607 (2003).
63. See generally Henkin, Rights: American and Human, supra note 5; Henkin, Constitutionalism, supra note 5.
64. See, for example, S. AFR. CONST. 1996 secs. 13, 15, modeled, respectively, after
ICCPR, supra note 21, arts. 8, 18. See also Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11
(U.K.); In Re Pub. Serv. Employee Relations Act (Alta.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313, 348 (Can.)
(Dickson, C.J., dissenting) (“The Charter conforms to the spirit of this contemporary
international human rights movement, and it incorporates many of the policies and prescriptions of the various international documents pertaining to human rights.”). To a
lesser extent, this is true of the 1992 Israeli Basic Laws. See Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, 1992, S.H. 1387, 114, available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/
1990_1999/1992/3/Basic%20Law-%20Freedom%20of%20Occupation- (last visited Jan.
27, 2006); Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 1992, S.H. 1391, 150, reprinted in
European Commission for Democracy Through Law, Basic Laws on Human Dignity and
Liberty and Freedom of Occupation of Israel (2002), available at http://www.venice.
coe.int/docs/2002/CDL(2002)129-e.asp.
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ration, since existing CL may be viewed as an implicit form of incorporation.65 Alas, in all surveyed legal systems there are considerable gaps
between the scope of coverage of CL and the country’s IHR treaty obligations;66 therefore, supplementary incorporation strategies are required.
Furthermore, similarly worded CL and IHR instruments might be differently construed by the respective domestic and international normappliers.67 Hence, the interpretive influence of IHR treaties ought to be
examined even with relation to similarly worded CL norms.
Second, the UK Human Rights Act of 1998 may be viewed as a form
of direct incorporation of an IHR treaty into domestic CL.68 The Act consolidates the status of the European HR Convention in UK law and confers a quasi-constitutional status upon rights recognized in the European
HR Convention.69 If the courts find primary legislation to be incompatible with a Convention right, they must uphold it, but they may make a
“declaration of incompatibility,” upon which a relevant government minister or the Queen in Council can rely to introduce amending legislation,
by way of order.70 Judicial review of existing legislation under European
HR Convention standards, as expounded in the jurisprudence of the
ECtHR (which UK courts should consider, though not necessarily follow),71 is thus a viable option under current UK CL. The recent decision
of the House of Lords in A v. Secretary of State on the unlawfulness of

65. See Gerald Heckman & Lorne Sossin, How Do Canadian Administrative Law
Protections Measure Up to International Human Rights Standards? The Case of Independence, 50 MCGILL L.J. 193, 201 (2005). The proposition that pre-existing domestic
law, including CL, may be viewed as a form of incorporation also indirectly derives from
General Comment No. 31 [80]: Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on State
Parties to the Covenant, para. 13, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., 80th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C
/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (2004).
66. For example, the ICESCR, which is binding upon the United Kingdom, Canada,
Israel and Australia, has not been incorporated into their domestic CL. The specific provisions of CERD had not been incorporated into the U.S. or South African Constitution.
67. See, e.g., David P. Stewart, United States Ratification of the Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights: The Significance of the Reservations, Understandings and Declarations, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1183, 1192–93 (1993) (discussing differences between the
prohibition of torture in international treaties and the U.S. Constitution); Heckman &
Sossin, supra note 65 (discussing potential difference in Canada between the constitutional and international standards of quasi-judicial independence).
68. Richard S. Lubliner, Comment, The Sky is Not Falling: Why the Human Rights
Act of 1998 Will Not Radically Affect English Freedom of Expression Law, 16 EMORY
INT’L L. REV. 263, 263 (2002). But see GROSZ ET AL., supra note 61, at 7–10.
69. Still, some doubt whether this reform signifies a radical departure from the past.
See id.
70. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, §§ 4, 10.
71. Id. § 2(1).
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administrative detentions under the post-September 11th anti-terror legislation aptly demonstrates the potential effectiveness of the process.72
Still, it is important to note the limits of this incorporation strategy.
The UK Human Rights Act authorizes, but does not require, courts to
review the compatibility of domestic legislation with the European HR
Convention,73 and it does not authorize courts to invalidate primary legislation. Instead, the question is relegated to the political branches, which
may ultimately choose to leave the incompatibility in place. Furthermore,
no similar acts of incorporation were undertaken with relation to other
IHR treaties to which the United Kingdom is a party (e.g., ICCPR,
ICESCR, CERD, CEDAW, CAT and CRC).74
2. Incorporation Through Interpretation
A second possible incorporation strategy is indirect incorporation
through canons of constitutional interpretation.75 Under this legal strategy, national courts may be obliged, or at least encouraged, to construe
domestic CL in light of IHR treaties that the state had ratified. Such an
indirect form of incorporation could substitute or supplement direct incorporation measures.
The harmonizing effect of incorporation by way of interpretation may
depend upon three key factors: the formal source of the interpretive doctrine, the degree of flexibility in its application, and the relationship between an interpretive presumption of conformity—requiring harmonization of IHR treaties and CL—and other CL interpretive presumptions.
The following sections address manifestations of the first two factors in
the laws of the surveyed states. The third factor has not yet been thor72. A v. Sec’y of State, [2005] 2 A.C. 68 (proclaiming the incompatibility of UK antiterrorism law with the European HR Convention).
73. See David Bonner et al., Judicial Approaches to the Human Rights Act, 52 INT’L
& COMP. L.Q. 549, 561–62 (2003). Bonner notes that there is marked judicial reluctance
to utilize the extraordinary quasi-constitution procedure introduced by the act, i.e., declarations of incompatibility. Id. at 554.
74. It may also be noted that EC law has been accorded an even stronger constitutional status under UK law by virtue of the European Communities Act, 1972. Hence,
UK statutes that are incompatible with EC law and cannot be reconciled with the latter
through interpretive means are inapplicable. See, e.g., Perceval-Price v. Dep’t of Econ.
Dev., [2000] NICA 141 (Civ) (N. Ir.); Shields v. E. Coomes (Holdings) Ltd., [1979] 1 All
E.R. 456, 461. To the degree that EC law includes IHR protections, this is another important potential avenue of incorporation of IHR law into the UK constitutional discourse.
However, no British court has attempted to date to construe Brussels law according to
IHR treaties (other than the European HR Convention).
75. Joan Hartman, Enforcement of International Human Rights Law in State and Federal Courts, 7 WHITTIER L. REV. 741, 741 (1985).
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oughly discussed in any of the surveyed legal systems. Hence, it suffices,
at present, merely to note its potentially disruptive effect, which might
hinder the effective incorporation of IHR treaties into CL. The relative
nature of an interpretive presumption designed to give effect to IHR treaties enables skeptical judges, apprehensive about the suitability of international law to govern domestic affairs, to prefer recourse to alternative
interpretive presumptions.76
i) Explicit Constitutional Directive versus Judge-Made Canon of Interpretation
In some legal systems, the constitution explicitly requires domestic
courts to use international law in general, and IHR treaties in particular,
as an interpretive source when construing CL.77 Two of the surveyed
common law countries, South Africa and the United Kingdom, have explicit CL provisions to that effect. Section 39(1) of the 1996 South African Constitution requires courts to consider international law when interpreting the Bill of Rights.78 Article 3(1) of the UK Human Rights Act
76. See, for example, the presumption that the legislator did not intend to repeal preexisting legislation. United States v. United Continental Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 164, 168
(1976); Reg’l Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 133 (1974); Amell v. United
States, 384 U.S. 158, 165–66 (1966); Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357
(1963); United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198–99 (1939). Courts have also
relied on the presumption that legislation does not carry extra-jurisdictional effect. EEOC
v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 253 (1991); United States v. Vasquez-Velasco, 15
F.3d 833, 839–40 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416,
443 (2d Cir. 1945).
77. For example, article 10(2) of the Spanish constitution provides: “Provisions relating to the fundamental rights and liberties recognized by the Constitution shall be construed in conformity with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and international
treaties and agreements thereon ratified by Spain.” Constitución Española art. 10(2)
(Spain). See also CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA OF 1977 art. 9(f)
(“[T]he state authority and all its agencies are obliged to direct their policies and programmes towards ensuring . . . that human dignity is preserved and upheld in accordance
with the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”). Acting upon this provision, the High Court of Tanzania construed the constitutional right of equal legal protection as encompassing a broad right of access to courts, in accordance with IHR treaties.
Ng’omango v. Mwangwa, Civil Case No. 22/1992, unreported (High Ct. of Tanz., Dodoma) (on file with author). The Court of Appeals, the highest court in Tanzania, also
accepted the relevance of IHR law for constitutional interpretation purposes in Pumbun v.
Attorney General, [1993] 2 L.R.C. 317. In another case, the High Court construed the
constitutional right to equality as consistent with IHR treaties to which Tanzania is party.
Ephrahim v. Pastory, 87 I.L.R. 106, 110 (1992).
78. Section 39(1) provides: “When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or
forum—(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based
on human dignity, equality and freedom; (b) must consider international law; and (c)
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provides: “So far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights.”79 Although, formally speaking, this
last presumption of conformity mainly applies to ordinary legislation, the
unique structure of the UK legal system would facilitate its application to
‘quasi-constitutional’ human rights norms protected by statutes and
common law principles, including constitutional-like European Union
(EU) legislation.80
At the same time, one can also identify judge-made canons of constitutional interpretation which refer to IHR treaties without clear constitutional mandate to do so.81 Among the surveyed countries, such a canon
may consider foreign law.” S. AFR. CONST. 1996 s. 39(1) (emphasis added). In practice,
IHR treaties and the international jurisprudence relating to their application have been
invoked in a number of influential constitutional cases. See S v Makwanyane 1995 (6)
BCLR 665 (CC) para. 35 (Chaskalson, J.) (stating that international human rights agreements should be considered in interpreting the right to life); Brink v Kitshoff NO 1996 (6)
BCLR 752 (CC) (construing the right to equality in light of IHR law); In re: The Sch.
Educ. Bill of 1995 (Gauteng) 1996 (4) BCLR 537 (CC) (construing the right to equality
in light of IHR law); Nat’l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. v Minister of Justice 1998
(12) BCLR 1517 (CC) paras. 40–46 (considering developments in IHR law in finding the
anti-sodomy laws unconstitutional). It is interesting to note that part of the process of
adopting the 1996 Constitution included certification by the Constitutional Court that the
Constitution comports with IHR standards. In re: Certification of the Constitution of the
Republic of S. Afr. 1996 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC). See also Ronald C. Slye, International Human Rights Law in Practice: International Law, Human Rights Beneficiaries
and South Africa: Some Thoughts on the Utility of International Human Rights Law, 2
CHI. J. INT’L L. 59, 67 (2001).
79. For discussion, see GROSZ ET AL., supra note 61, at 28.
80. Id. at 43.
81. See Simma et al., supra note 60, at 95. A number of civil law countries also habitually use international human rights standards when interpreting their constitutions.
See, e.g., Polakiewicz & Jacob-Foltzer, supra note 17, at 125, 140 (discussing
Liechtenstein and Turkey respectively). In the common law world, it is notable that New
Zealand’s High Court has been willing to construe the Bill of Rights Act 1990 (which
incorporates numerous civil and political rights in New Zealand law and introduces a
weak system of quasi-constitutional review) in light of the ICCPR, without explicit
authorization. Ministry of Transp. v. Noort Police [1992] 3 N.Z.L.R. 260 (C.A.), 1992
NZLR LEXIS 657, at *33. Similarly, the Indian Supreme Court has shown in recent years
increasing willingness to construe domestic law, including the Indian Constitution, in
light of IHR instruments, although the Constitution gives no clear mandate to do so. Note
that article 51 of the Indian Constitution of India instructs the Indian State to “foster respect for international law and treaty obligations in the dealings of organized people with
one another.” INDIA CONST. art. 51, cl. c. Nevertheless, Indian courts have refrained from
construing it as encompassing a duty to incorporate international law into domestic law.
See, e.g., Quamar v. Tsavliris Salvage (Int’l) Ltd., (2000) 3 L.R.I. 886, para. 32 (S.C.).
For example, in one case the Indian Supreme Court relied on a number of international
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has been accepted by the Canadian judiciary. A number of Canadian Supreme Court decisions have consciously used IHR treaties to construe
Canada’s supreme constitutional instrument, the Charter,82 although
some academic and judicial criticism of these decisions persists.83
treaties to support the conclusion that IHR law prohibits sexual harassment on the job and
to construe the constitutional rights to equality and to liberty accordingly. Apparel Export
Promotion Council v. Chopra, A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 625, para. 27, available at http://
orissagov.nic.in/wcd/pdf/judgement1.pdf.
82. For example, the Canadian Supreme Court held in one case that the right to freedom of expression under the Charter should be limited in order to facilitate the right to
work, enshrined in the ICESCR to which Canada is party. Slaight Commc’ns Inc. v.
Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038, 1056–57 (Dickson, C.J.). In another case, it used IHR
instruments to support the invalidation of a law reversing the burden of proof in certain
drug-related criminal cases. R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 120–21. In yet another
case the Court relied upon the ICCPR and CERD to exclude hate speech from the scope
of constitutionally protected freedom of speech. R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697. In
another more recent case the Court cited abolitionist trends in international law to support
construing the Charter prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment as prohibiting
extradition of suspects to death-penalty countries without assurances that the death penalty would not be requested. United States v. Burns, [2001] S.C.R. 283, 332–35. See also
In Re Pub. Serv. Employee Relations Act (Alta.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313, 358–59 (Dickson,
C.J., dissenting) (stating that freedom of association encompasses the right to strike
which is protected by the ICESCR and other treaties to which Canada is party); Kindler
v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779, 827–28 (Cory, J., dissenting) (arguing that the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment and the scope
of protection of the Charter should be construed in light of Canada’s international obligations); B. v. Children’s Aid Soc’y of Metro. Toronto, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315, para. 38
(Lamer, C.J.) (arguing that article 7 of the Charter should be construed in light of the
ICCPR and other international instruments); R. v. Advance Cutting & Coring Ltd.,
[2001] 3 S.C.R. 209, 232–36 (Bastarache, J., dissenting) (arguing that freedom of association should be construed in light of the ICESCR and other international instruments
providing for the right not to join unions). See also Bayefsky, supra note 38, at 323–24
(citing governmental officials supportive of this legal development). It is notable that
those few occasions in which international law was applied to aid in the interpretation of
the Canadian Charter involved IHR treaties. See id. at 319 (“Human rights cases in Canadian courts might turn out to be sui generis.”). This supports the argument developed
below, that special considerations support the incorporation of IHR treaties, and not other
international law instruments, into CL.
83. See In Re Pub. Serv. Employee Relations Act (Alta.), 1 S.C.R. at 314–17 (concluding that freedom of association does not include a right to strike notwithstanding the
ICESCR); Prof’l Inst. of the Pub. Serv. of Can. v. Northwest Territories (Comm’r),
[1990] 2 S.C.R. 367, 404 (holding that freedom of association does not include the right
to collective bargaining, which is protected in numerous ILO conventions to which Canada is party); Keegstra, 3 S.C.R. at 702 (McLachlin, J., dissenting); Baker v. Canada,
[1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, 865 (Iacobucci, J., concurring) (opposing the view that the court
should look to unimplemented international treaties in statutory interpretation). See also
Stephane Beaulac, Arretons de dire que les tribunaux au Canada sont lies par le droit
international [Let’s Stop Saying that Canadian Tribunals are Bound by International
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By contrast, in the other surveyed common law jurisdictions, the
United States, Australia and Israel, the permissibility of resort to IHR
treaties when construing CL instruments is rather controversial. Although in the 2005 Roper case a majority of U.S. Supreme Court justices
accepted the relevance of IHR treaties to a dynamic interpretation of the
Eighth Amendment,84 the resort to international law sources was acerbically criticized by some minority justices.85 Since application of IHR
treaties by the U.S. Supreme Court in CL cases can be described as sporadic and controversial at best,86 the existence of a canon of interpretation incorporating IHR into CL is doubtful. The fact that the U.S. constitutional debate over the status of IHR treaties has largely taken place in
footnotes, and not in the body of the opinions, may attest to the marginality of this canon of interpretation in the Supreme Court’s CL discourse.87
Law], 38 REVUE JURIDIQUE THEMIS [R.J.T.] 359 (2004) (Can.); Bayefsky, supra note 38,
at 318–19 (discussing discrepancies between Charter interpretations and Canada’s international obligations).
84. Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1199–201 (2005). Similar reliance on IHR
treaties was advocated by some individual judges on a number of occasions. See, e.g.,
Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 996 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting the criticism
expressed by the HRC in Barrett v. Jamaica, Commc’n No. 271/1988, para. 8(4), U.N.
Hum. Rts. Comm., 44th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/44/D/271/1988 (1992), on “disturbingly long” delays in execution of convicts).
85. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1226 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he basic premise of the
Court’s argument—that American law should conform to the laws of the rest of the
world—ought to be rejected out of hand.”). See also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S.
815, 869 n.4 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Foster v. Florida 537 U.S. 990, 990 n.*
(2002) (Thomas, J., concurring); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 324–25 (2002)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 347–48 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Prize for the
Court’s Most Feeble Effort to fabricate ‘national consensus’ must go to its appeal . . . to
the views of . . . members of the so-called ‘world community’ . . . . I agree with the Chief
Justice that [their] views . . . are irrelevant.”) (citations omitted); Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
86. For a discussion of the consideration of IHR treaties in some CL cases, see
generally Richard J. Wilson, International Law Issues in Death Penalty Defense, 31
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1195 (2003); Joan Fitzpatrick, The Relevance of Customary International Norms to the Death Penalty in the United States, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 165
(1995–1996); Joan F. Hartman, “Unusual” Punishment: The Domestic Effects of International Norms Restricting the Application of the Death Penalty, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 655
(1983); Gordon A. Christenson, Using Human Rights Law to Inform Due Process and
Equal Protection Analyses, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 3 (1983).
87. For example, in Thompson both the majority and the dissent addressed the relevance of foreign and international sources in footnotes. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 831
n.31, 869 n.4. See also Foster, 537 U.S. at 990 n.*. However, lower federal courts and
state courts might prove more hospitable fora. See, e.g., Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1388 (10th Cir. 1981); Lipscomb v. Simmons, 884 F.2d 1242, 1244
n.1 (9th Cir. 1989); Lareau v. Manson, 507 F. Supp. 1177, 1187–88 n.9 (D. Conn. 1980);
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In Australia too, the permissibility of relying upon IHR treaties when
construing the Constitution remains controversial. While one High Court
judge, Michael Kirby, has forcefully argued in favor of a presumption of
conformity encouraging interpretation of the Constitution in light of IHR
law,88 no other High Court judge has yet voiced explicit support of the
theory89 (although several judges have made occasional references to
IHR standards in their CL decisions, without expounding a coherent interpretive theory).90 On the contrary, some High Court judges have explicitly rejected the applicability of the presumption of conformity to the
Constitution.91 It is thus fair to conclude that the constitutional status of
IHR treaties in Australia is still very much unsettled.
The constitutional status of IHR treaties in Israel is also uncertain. Although Israel’s Supreme Court has used IHR treaties to inform its interpretation of constitutional rights in several recent cases,92 there has yet to
Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d 123, 131–32 (Or. 1981); State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112
S.W.3d 397, 411 (Mo. 2003). See also Martha F. Davis, International Human Rights and
United States Law: Predictions of a Courtwatcher, 64 ALB. L. REV. 417, 428–29 (2000);
Using Human Rights, supra note 86, at 14–17. But see McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461,
1466 (9th Cir. 1995) (“With all due respect to our colleagues abroad, we do not believe
[their] view will prevail in the United States.”).
88. Austin v. Australia (2003) 215 C.L.R. 185, 291–93 (Kirby, J., partly concurring)
(construing the Constitution in a way which conforms with the right to independent judiciary); Kartinyeri v. Commonwealth (1998) 195 C.L.R. 337, 400 (Kirby, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the constitutional power to regulate race issues must be exercised in light of
the international prohibition against discrimination).
89. See Michael Kirby, Hon. J. of the High Ct. of Austl., The Road from Bangalore:
The First Ten Years of the Bangalore Principles on the Domestic Application of International Human Rights Norms, at 13, http://www.hcourt.gov.au/speeches/kirbyj/kirbyj_
bang11.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2005). See also Kristen Walker, International Law as a
Tool of Constitutional Interpretation, 28 MONASH U. L. REV. 85, 86 (2002).
90. See, e.g., Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v. Teoh (1995) 183 C.L.R.
273, 304–05 (Gaudron, J.). However, it should be noted that in most cases recourse was
made to non-binding treaties and jurisprudence, confirming the dominance of the comparative law paradigm for using international law. See, e.g., Polyukhovich v. Commonwealth (1991) 172 C.L.R. 501, 611–12; Nationwide News Pty. Ltd. v. Wills (1992) 177
C.L.R. 1, 47 n.53 (referring to a decision by the ECtHR regarding the freedom of expression under the European HR Convention).
91. Western Australia v. Ward (2002) 213 C.L.R. 1, 390 (Callinan, J., dissenting);
Kartinyeri, 195 C.L.R. at 384 (Gummow & Hayne, JJ.) (arguing that courts should interpret statutes in conformity with international law as far as their language permits, but
otherwise “the provisions of such a law must be applied and enforced even if they be in
contravention of accepted principles of international law”); AMS v. AIF (1999) 199
C.L.R. 160, 180 (Gleeson, C.J., McHugh & Gummow, JJ.); Al-Kateb v. Godwin (2004)
208 A.L.R. 124, paras. 62–73 (Gleeson, C.J.).
92. See, e.g., HCJ 5100/94 Public Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov’t of Israel,
[1999] IsrSC 53(4) 817, translated in HCJ 5100/94 Isr. L. Rep. 1; CrimA. 7048/97
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be a decision delineating a coherent theory of incorporation by way of
interpretation of the Basic Laws.
ii) Presumption of Conformity Versus Discretionary Weighing
A second factor for assessing the ability of interpretative canons to
harmonize CL and IHR treaties is the existence of judicial discretion, i.e.,
whether courts may or should harmonize CL and IHR treaties. One
common model for incorporating international law in domestic law is the
“presumption of conformity” doctrine.93 Many domestic legal systems
Anonymous v. Minister of Def., [2000] IsrSC 54(1) 721; HCJ 2599/00 YATED—NonProfit Org. for Parents of Children with Down Syndrome v. Minister of Educ., [2002]
IsrSC 56(5) 843, translated in [2002–2003] IsrLR 57. An analogous trend can be identified in cases involving the situation in the Occupied Territories. See HCJ 7015/02 Ajuri
v. IDF Commander in West Bank, [2002] IsrSC 56(6) 352, translated in [2002] IsrLR 1;
HCJ 3278/02 Ctr. for the Def. of the Individual v. Commander of the IDF Forces in the
West Bank, [2002] IsrSC 57(1) 385; HCJ 5591/02 Yassin v. Ben David—Commander of
the Kziot Military Camp—Kziot Detention Facility, [2002] IsrSC 57(1) 403; HCJ
3239/02 Marab v. IDF Commander in the West Bank, [2003] IsrSC 57(2) 349. However,
reference to international law in these cases should be evaluated against the backdrop of
legal doubts pertaining to the applicability of Israeli CL in the Territories. See, e.g.,
Marab, [2003] IsrSC 57(2) 349, para. 12. Hence, the value of these cases in providing
guidance on the interaction between Israeli CL and IHR treaties is limited.
93. The doctrine has also been referred to as the “presumption of compatibility,”
“presumption of compliance,” or, in the United States, as the Charming Betsy canon of
interpretation. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804) (“[A]n act
of [C]ongress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains . . . .”). The doctrine has been viewed as indicative of respect for
other nations. Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815, 830 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Thomas,
893 F.2d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir. 1990); Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corp. v. Simon,
153 F.3d 991, 998 (9th Cir. 1998). The same rule has since been adopted in numerous
other decisions. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S.
243, 252 (1984); Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345
U.S. 571, 578 (1953); Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933); Heong v. United
States, 112 U.S. 536, 540 (1884); United States v. Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp.
1456, 1465 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). See also Henkin, supra note 6, at 192; William N. Eskridge,
Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 604 (1992). At the same time, courts also
sometimes attempt to construe treaties in light of statutory law, in order to avoid the repeal of earlier statutes. See, e.g., Johnson v. Browne, 205 U.S. 309, 321 (1907); United
States v. Lee Yen Tai, 185 U.S. 213, 222–23 (1902); Blanco v. United States, 775 F.2d
53, 61 (2d Cir. 1985).
The Charming Betsy canon has also been codified in the Third Restatement of
Foreign Relations Law: “Where fairly possible, a United States statute is to be construed
so as not to conflict with international law or with an international agreement of the
United States.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 114 (1987). Note, however, that the Restatement introduces an element of rea-
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(including all of the surveyed common law legal systems) apply a rule of
interpretation prescribing that ordinary legislation be construed, as far as
possible, in harmony with the international obligations of the state.94 This
presumption is often presented as reflective of a hypothetical parliamentary intent—that, barring contrary evidence, judges must assume that
legislators had not intended to compromise their state’s international obligations via legislation.95
However, courts in most of the surveyed legal systems do not apply
this canon of interpretation to their CL, even when they are prepared to
seek guidance from international law sources. Instead, references to IHR
treaties often seem to be based on a weaker, comparative law framework
of analysis, based upon the inherent persuasiveness of IHR law (whether
binding or not upon the relevant jurisdiction), and not on a recognized
duty to incorporate it into CL.96 Under this interpretive model, courts
retain considerable discretion on whether or not to harmonize CL and
IHR treaties. For example, in the rare cases where IHR instruments and
their treaty bodies’ case law were invoked by U.S. Supreme Court justices, they were addressed within a weak interpretive framework alluding
to the informative value of comparative law or non-binding international

sonableness in the application of the doctrine, which the original canon lacked. It is also
questionable whether the doctrine applies at the non-federal level, i.e., in state courts.
Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 827–32. It may be noted that Bradley and Goldsmith even question the applicability of the presumption of compliance at the federal
level. Id. at 871–72.
94. See, e.g., Higgins, supra note 34, at 47; Mabo v. Queensland (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1,
42 (Austl.); Daniels v. White, [1968] S.C.R. 517, 541 (Pigeon, J., concurring) (Can.); S.
AFR. CONST. 1996 s. 233 (“When interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer any
reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with international law over
any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with international law.”). While the present article focuses on common law systems, the presumption of conformity is also well
known in civil law countries. See, e.g., Simma et al., supra note 60, at 94; Buergenthal,
supra note 5, at 366.
95. See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 6, at 192; Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy
Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role of International Law,
86 GEO. L.J. 479, 495–98 (1998). However, a distinction can be made between two possible standards of conformity with international law: normative construction that corresponds to the norms of international law, or normative construction that merely refrains
from violating international law. See id. at 500–02. Bradley argues that, in the field of
constitutional interpretation, adoption of the more restrictive approach will minimize any
impact of international law upon the Constitution, as the latter almost never requires (as
opposed to facilitates) the violation of international law. Id. at 503–04.
96. See, e.g., Knop, supra note 35, at 520 (“Because . . . relevance is not based on
bindingness, the status of international and foreign law becomes similar . . . .”).
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law,97 and not within the stronger Charming Betsy canon.98 Indeed, references to IHR law usually fail to distinguish between norms binding upon
the United States and other sources, such as ECHR standards and jurisprudence, which are clearly non-binding.99
97. See Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1200 (2005) (“The opinion of the world
community, while not controlling our outcome, does provide respected and significant
confirmation for our own conclusions.”); Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 997 (1999)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]his Court has long considered as relevant and informative the
way in which foreign courts have applied standards roughly comparable to our own constitutional standards in roughly comparable circumstances.”); Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S.
990, 993 (2002) (“Just as ‘attention to the judgment of other nations’ can help Congress
determine ‘the justice and propriety of [America’s] measures,’ so it can help guide this
Court when it decides whether a particular punishment violates the Eighth Amendment.”)
(alteration in original) (quoting The Federalist No. 63 (James Madison)); Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 831 n.31 (1988); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1019
(1991) (White, J., dissenting); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 649–50 (1948) (Black,
J., concurring); id. at 670 (Murphy, J., concurring). There have been many other cases in
which the practice of foreign nations was cited in approval in order to support a particular
interpretation of the Constitution. See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102–03 (1958);
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1977); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796
n.22 (1982); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 324 (1988); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,
316 n.21 (2002); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576 (2003) (discussing Dudgeon v.
United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) (1981) and citing with approval three other
ECtHR cases). See also Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98
AM. J. INT’L L. 43, 46 (2004); Neuman, supra note 6, at 89–90; Alford, supra note 9, at
775–80 (noting that while the U.S. Supreme Court has considered practices of foreign
nations, it has done so only to bolster an existing national consensus).
98. See Koh, supra note 97, at 53 (noting that Justices of the transnationalist persuasion do not “distinguish sharply between the relevance of foreign and international law”).
Another approach to the use of international law is to utilize it as a negative test, i.e., in
order to refute claims that U.S. standards are unworkable or inherently incompatible with
fundamental human rights notions. Michael D. Ramsey, International Materials and
Domestic Rights: Reflections on Atkins and Lawrence, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 69, 75–76
(2004).
99. For example, in Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045 (1995), in a memorandum respecting the denial of certiorari, Justice Stevens relied on the House of Lords decision in
Pratt v. Jamaica, [1994] 2 A.C. 1, 4 All E.R. 769, but not on interpretations of the
ICCPR suggesting that unreasonable delays in carrying out death sentences could be
viewed under some circumstances as inconsistent with the prohibition against torture and
other cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment in article 7 of the Covenant. See, e.g.,
Kindler v. Canada, Commc’n No. 470/1991, paras. 15(2)–(3), U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm.,
48th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/48/D/470/1991 (1993); Cox v. Canada, Commc’n No.
539/1993, para. 17(2), U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., 52d Sess., U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/52/D/539/1993 (1994). See also Elledge v. Florida, 525 U.S. 944, 944 (1998)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (relying on Pratt, 2 A.C. at 17, and the ECtHR decision in Soering
v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 439 (1989), but not on interpretations of the
ICCPR); Foster, 537 U.S. at 992–93 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Pratt, Soering, and
the Canadian Supreme Court judgment in United States v. Burns, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283,
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Similarly, in Israel, the Supreme Court has tended to use international
law only to confirm conclusions which the Court independently deduced
from Israeli CL. To date, there has been no conscious attempt to construe
the latter in conformity with IHR treaties.100 The only exception is the
YATED case that involved judge-made CL, which has limited constitutional status under Israel’s legal system.101 Furthermore, the Court’s relevant jurisprudence did not clearly distinguish between binding and nonbinding international treaty law.102
Even in South Africa, whose Constitution requires the judiciary to consider IHR law, no presumption of conformity exists with relation to interpretations of the Constitution. In the words of South Africa’s Constitutional Court: “We can derive assistance from public international law and
foreign case law, but we are in no way bound to follow it.”103 Still, in

but not interpretations of the ICCPR); Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830–31 (reviewing the
growing objection to the death penalty, in general, and to putting minors to death, in particular, in numerous foreign countries, and noting that two international treaties to which
the United States was not party at the time, the ICCPR and the I/A CHR prohibit sentencing juveniles to death, but not discussing their potential customary law status); Lawrence,
539 U.S. at 576 (discussing ECtHR cases on anti-sodomy laws but failing to mention the
parallel jurisprudence of the HRC on the incompatibility of such laws with the ICCPR).
An exception can be found in Knight, 528 U.S. at 996 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting the
criticism expressed by the HRC on “disturbingly long” delays in execution of convicts).
100. In fact, the Supreme Court seemed to implicitly reject, in a recent case, the relevance of IHR treaties to interpretation of the Basic Laws. HCJ 4128/02 Adam, Teva VaDin (Isr. Union for Envtl. Def.) v. Prime Minister of Isr., [2004] IsrSC 58(3) 503.
101. HCJ 2599/00 YATED—Non-Profit Org. for Parents of Children with Down Syndrome v. Minister of Educ., [2002] IsrSC 56(5) 843, translated in [2002–2003] IsrLR 57.
Most importantly, judge-made CL cannot invalidate incompatible legislation.
102. For example, in Public Committee Against Torture the Supreme Court relied,
inter alia, upon a judgment of ECtHR, by which Israel is not bound. HCJ 5100/94 Public
Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov’t of Israel [1999] IsrSC 53(4) 817, translated in
HCJ 5100/94 Isr. L. Rep. 1, 28. In Anonymous, the Court equally cited ratified and nonratified IHR treaties. CrimA. 7048/97 Anonymous v. Minister of Def., [2000] IsrSC
54(1) 721. In another recent case, involving the delineation of a constitutional right to a
satisfactory environment, the Supreme Court seems to have accorded IHR treaties the
same status it accorded comparative constitutional law. HCJ 4128/02 Adam, Teva VaDin (Isr. Union for Envtl. Def.) v. Prime Minister of Isr., [2004] IsrSC 58(3) 503.
103. S v Makwanyane 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) para. 39 (Chaskalson, J.). Indeed, in
that case, the Constitutional Court indiscriminately cited a variety of IHR sources—
binding and not binding upon South Africa—in support of its decision that the right to
life protected by the interim 1993 Constitution does not allow capital punishment:
In the context of section 35(1) [now 39(1)], public international law would include non-binding as well as binding law. They may both be used under the
section as tools of interpretation. International agreements and customary inter-

370

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 31:2

subsequent cases, the Constitutional Court seems to have edged towards
a rebuttable presumption of conformity.104
Unlike the South African Constitution, the UK Human Rights Act introduced an unmistakable duty to harmonize domestic law and the European HR Convention.105 It remains unclear, however, how the residual
judge-made presumption of conformity will apply to other IHR treaties
to which the United Kingdom is a party106 (e.g., whether it introduces
discretionary or obligatory standards).107

national law accordingly provide a framework within which Chapter 3 [the Bill
of Rights] can be evaluated and understood . . . .
Id. para. 35. For a discussion of the case, see Ann-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of
Transjudicial Communication, in INTERNATIONAL LAW DECISIONS IN NATIONAL COURTS,
supra note 14, at 37, 67–69. This stance can be contrasted to the more robust function of
international law under the general presumption of conformity which applies to ordinary
legislation, according to section 233 of the Constitution, which prescribes courts to always strive to construe ordinary legislation in accordance with international law. S. AFR.
CONST. 1996 s. 233.
104. The following passage illustrates the Court’s leaning towards the presumption:
International law and the contents of international treaties to which South Africa might or might not be a party at any particular time are, in my view, relevant only in the interpretation of the Constitution itself, on the grounds that the
lawmakers of the Constitution should not lightly be presumed to authorise any
law which might constitute a breach of the obligations of the State in terms of
international law.
Azanian Peoples Org. (AZAPO) v President of the Republic of S. Afr. 1996 (8) BCLR
1015 (CC) para. 26 (Mahomed, J.). However, at another part of the same decision, the
Court opined that it should only “have regard” to international law when construing the
Constitution. Id. para. 27. For other decisions influenced by IHR treaties, see Christian
Educ. S. Afr. v Minister of Educ. 2000 (10) BCLR 1051 (CC) para. 39 (holding that prohibition against corporal punishment is consistent with the provisions of the Constitution); NUMSA v Bader Bop (Pty) Ltd. 2003 (2) BCLR 182 (CC) para. 26 (finding that
right to strike should be construed in accordance with ILO). For similar interpretative
strategies in the decisions of lower South African courts, see, for example, Prince v
President of the Law Society, Cape of Good Hope 1998 (8) BCLR 976 (C) (holding that
ban on ritual use of marijuana is not unconstitutional); Residents of Bon Vista Mansions v
S. Metro. Local Council 2002 (6) BCLR 625 (W) (holding that disconnecting of water
supply is unconstitutional); S v K 1997 (9) BCLR 1283 (C) (finding anti-sodomy law
unconstitutional); Nyamakazi v President of Bophuthatswana (1994) (1) BCLR 92 (B)
(restrictions upon freedom of association of aliens held unconstitutional).
105. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 3(1).
106. Uncertainties relating to the application of the general presumption of conformity
include:
a) Doubts whether the presumption applies to all legal interpretation projects,
including common law doctrines, to statutes only, or solely to the interpretation of stat-
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utes which explicitly or implicitly refer to international standards. The following passages illustrate these doubts:
I readily accept that if the question before me were one of construing a statute
enacted with the purpose of giving effect to obligations imposed by the Convention, the court would readily seek to construe the legislation in a way that
would effectuate the Convention rather than frustrate it. However, no relevant
legislation of that sort is in existence. It seems to me that where Parliament has
abstained from legislating on a point that is plainly suitable for legislation, it is
indeed difficult for the court to lay down new rules of common law or equity
that will carry out the Crown’s treaty obligations, or to discover for the first
time that such rules have always existed.
Malone v. Metro. Police Comm’r, [1979] 2 W.L.R. 700, 731–32 (Ch.).
Further cases in which the court may not only be empowered but required to
adjudicate upon the meaning or scope of the terms of an international treaty
arise where domestic legislation, although not incorporating the treaty, nevertheless requires, either expressly or by necessary implication, resort to be had to
its terms for the purpose of construing the legislation.
J.H. Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd. v. Dep’t of Trade & Indus., [1989] 3 W.L.R. 969, 1002
(H.L.). See also AG v. Guardian Newspapers, [1988] 3 W.L.R. 776, 798 (H.L.); Derbyshire CC v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [1992] 3 W.L.R. 28, 44 (C.A.) (both cases apply the
presumption of conformity to the common law).
b) Doubts whether the presumption of conformity permits judges to alter the ordinary meaning of statutory instruments, or only applies when the existing legislation is
demonstrably open to more than one meaning. Cf. GROSZ ET AL., supra note 61, at 34.
c) Conflicting decisions have been rendered on whether the presumption of conformity applies in the field of administrative law so as to govern the acts of public officials. Compare Ex parte Singh, [1976] 1 Q.B. 198 (requiring immigration officers to bear
in mind the principles of the European HR Convention), Ex parte Phansopkar, [1976] 1
Q.B. 606, 626 (Scarman, L.J.) (public authorities should have regard to the European HR
Convention), and Rantzen v. Mirror Group Newspapers, [1994] Q.B. 670, 691 (“It is also
clear that article 10 [of the European HR Convention] may be used when the court is
contemplating how a discretion is to be exercised.”), with Ex parte Bibi, [1976] W.L.R.
979 (C.A.) (holding that immigration officers are not required to know about the European HR Convention), Fernandes v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [1981] Imm.
A.R. 1 (determining that the Home Secretary is not obligated to consider the European
HR Convention), and Ex parte Brind, [1991] 1 A.C. 696 (H.L.) (finding no presumption
that the executive must exercise its discretion in conformity with the European HR Convention). Cf. Tavita v. Minister of Immigration, [1994] 2 N.Z.L.R. 257, 266 (C.A.) (N.Z.)
(noting that respondent’s argument that the Crown is entitled to ignore international conventions is “unattractive” and implies “that New Zealand’s adherence to the international
instruments has been at least partly window-dressing”).
107. Compare Maclaine Watson & Co. v. Dep’t of Trade, [1988] 3 All E.R. 257, 269,
291 (C.A.) (referring to freedom of courts to invoke international treaties), with Guardian
Newspapers, 3 W.L.R. at 798, and Times Newspapers, 3 W.L.R. at 44–45 (both cases
referring to the duty of judges to construe English law in accordance with the Crown’s
international obligations).
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The only surveyed jurisdiction that applies a general presumption of
conformity at the CL level is Canada. In Slaight Communications, the
majority of Canada’s Supreme Court embraced Judge Dickson’s opinion
that:
[C]anada’s international human rights obligations should inform not
only the interpretation of the content of the rights guaranteed by the
Charter but also the interpretation of what can constitute pressing and
substantial s.1 objectives which may justify restrictions upon those
rights . . . . [T]he fact that a value has the status of an international human right, either in customary international law or under a treaty to
which Canada is a State Party, should generally be indicative of a high
degree of importance attached to that objective.108

Judge Dickson, the main proponent of incorporating IHR treaties into
Canadian CL, did not explicitly link the “general principles of constitutional interpretation [which] require that these international obligations
be a relevant and persuasive factor in Charter interpretation”109 to the
presumption of conformity relevant to the construction of ordinary legislation.110 Yet, there can be little doubt that he was of the view that the
presumption of conformity has some place within Canadian constitutional discourse. Equating ratification of treaties with social endorsement
of the norms expounded in them, which, in turn, supports their importation into the Charter, comes very close to advocating a reading of the
Charter that conforms to Canada’s international obligations. The difference between the two modes of reasoning—one focusing on embracing
values and the other on international legality—could be viewed as rhetorical or tactical.

108. Slaight Commc’ns Inc. v. Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038, 1056–57 (Dickson,
C.J.). See also Baker v. Canada, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, 861 (L’Heureux-Dubé, J.) (“[International Human Rights Law] is also a critical influence on the interpretation of the scope
of the rights included in the Charter.”) (citations omitted); In Re Pub. Serv. Employee
Relations Act (Alta.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313, 349 (Dickson, C.J., dissenting) (“The general
principles of constitutional interpretation require that these international obligations be a
relevant and persuasive factor in Charter interpretation.”).
109. In re Pub. Serv. Employee Relations Act (Alta.), 1 S.C.R. at 349. Cf. Newcrest
Mining (WA) Ltd. v. Commonwealth (1997) 190 C.L.R. 513, 657–58 (Kirby, J., concurring) (noting that while common law and constitutional law “do not necessarily conform
with international law,” the latter is “a legitimate and important influence” on the development of the former).
110. The presumption of conformity is well-established under Canadian law. See, e.g.,
Daniels v. White, [1968] S.C.R. 517, 541 (Pigeon, J., concurring); Bayefsky, supra note
38, at 300–02.
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B. Assessment of Compliance of the Surveyed Jurisdictions with the Duty
to Incorporate Human Rights Treaties into Constitutional Law
The short study of the law and practice undertaken above suggests that
the majority of the surveyed common law systems fail to offer a satisfactory degree of incorporation of IHR treaties into their CL. CL in all six
jurisdictions explicitly reflects only some IHR norms. For example, in
the United Kingdom, the Human Rights Act only covers IHR norms enshrined in the European HR Convention, but not in other binding IHR
instruments.111 Additional harmonization measures are therefore necessary. Nevertheless, most countries have failed to establish effective canons of interpretation capable of harmonizing domestic CL and IHR treaty
norms. In the United States, resort by the Supreme Court to IHR treaties
has been sporadic and conducted within a weak “comparative law” analytical framework, and not within the stronger Charming Betsy canon. In
Israel and Australia, the applicability of a presumption of conformity to
CL remains unsettled. Even in South Africa, whose Constitution mandates consideration of IHR treaties in CL cases, the Constitutional Court
is not bound to follow their prescriptions, and may prefer other interpretations of the Bill of Rights. Hence, the study reveals deficiencies in the
rules designed to incorporate IHR treaties into CL, which might lead, in
turn, to violation of the international duty to harmonize the two bodies of
law.
Of the surveyed countries, only Canada offers good prospects of harmonization across-the-board at present, as the Canadian Supreme Court
is inclined to construe domestic CL in the light of the various IHR norms
binding upon Canada. But even there, judicial resistance to the role of
IHR can be identified. Further, some confusion still surrounds the manner of applying the presumption of conformity to CL.112 In particular,
111. It is an open question whether other IHR treaties to which the United Kingdom is
party could be utilized in order to influence a UK court’s interpretation of European HR
Convention rights enumerated in the 1998 Act. There is yet no definite answer to this
question, although preliminary indications do not indicate any tendency to utilize such an
elaborate interpretive construction. See Bonner et al., supra note 73, at 582 (describing
misapplication of the Convention on the Rights of the Child by the English judiciary in
the context of a case under the Human Rights Act). But see A v. Sec’y of State, [2005] 2
A.C. 68, para. 62 (utilizing non-European HR Convention sources to delineate a right
under the convention).
112. First, there remains some controversy as to whether the presumption of conformity applies only with respect to patently ambiguous statutes which necessitate interpretive aids or with regard to all statutes, including clearly worded statutes (which could,
however, when compared to international law, be viewed as ambiguous). Compare
Schavernoch v. Foreign Claims Comm’n, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 1092, 1098, and Capital Cities
Commc’ns Inc. v. Can. Radio-Television Comm’n, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 141, 173 (in both
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there is no clear authority on whether the very resort to the presumption
of conformity is mandatory or discretionary.113

cases, the presumption was held to be applicable only in case of ambiguity), with Am.
Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Can. Import Trib., [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1324, 1372 (the presumption is
also applicable in cases of ‘latent’ ambiguity—asserted after examination of international
law—and not only in cases of ‘patent’ ambiguity), and Milne v. R., [1987] 2 S.C.R. 512,
527 (explicit Charter provision bars reference to the ICCPR). See also Bayefsky, supra
note 38, at 312–18. When applied to the CL context, the degree of textual ambiguity that
triggers the introduction of IHR treaties into Charter interpretation processes is also unclear. Cf. GROSZ ET AL., supra note 61, at 34–41 (discussing the degree of ambiguity
needed to invoke IHR law in the United Kingdom). Second, the majority of Supreme
Court judges have applied the presumption of conformity to incorporated and unincorporated international treaties equally. See Slaight Commc’ns, 1 S.C.R. at 1056–57 (not distinguishing between incorporated and non-incorporated treaties); Baker, 2 S.C.R. at 861
(L’Heureux-Dubé, J.) (non-incorporated treaties may help statutory interpretation and
judicial review); Mercure v. Att’y Gen. for Sask., [1988] 1 S.C.R. 234, 268 (supporting
interpretation of Canadian legislation through reference to the ICCPR, which was not
incorporated in Canada); Bell Can. v. Quebec, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 749 (using unincorporated
treaties to support argument that federal authority to regulate certain labor standards
should encompass right to safe working conditions); Bayefsky, supra note 38, at 315–20.
Yet, at least one Supreme Court judge has criticized this approach. See Baker, 2 S.C.R. at
865–66 (Iacobucci, J., concurring). Bayefsky also notes the Supreme Court’s tendency
not to distinguish between international treaties to which Canada is party and other international instruments not biding upon it. Bayefsky, supra note 38, at 320–23. See also
Knop, supra note 35, at 513.
113. Slaight Commc’ns, 1 S.C.R. at 1056 (“Canada’s international human rights obligations should inform . . . the interpretation of the content of the rights guaranteed . . . .”)
(emphasis added). But see In Re Pub. Serv. Employee Relations Act (Alta.), 1 S.C.R. at
349 (Dickson, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]hough I do not believe the judiciary is bound by the
norms of international law in interpreting the Charter, these norms provide a relevant and
persuasive source for interpretation of the provisions of the Charter . . . .”). The relatively
modest number of cases in which the presumption was applied in the constitutional context in Canada perhaps suggests that despite occasional suggestions to the contrary, the
presumption is not being applied in a systematic manner, and judges do in fact exercise
considerable discretion in the matter. Bayefsky, supra note 38, at 318; Knop, supra note
35, at 512–13. Similar ambiguity can be found in the decisions of Judge Kirby in Australia. See, e.g., Austin v. Australia (2003) 215 C.L.R. 185, 291–92 (Kirby, J., partly concurring) (“It is at least as useful in considering questions of basic legal principle concerning
the content of Australian law to have regard to this source as it is to examine the nonbinding expositions of the law appearing in English cases of centuries ago, often dealing
with problems in a context quite different from that of the contemporary world.”). See
also Council of the Shire of Ballina v. Ringland, 1994 NSW LEXIS 14010, at *82 (C.A.)
(N.S.W.) (Kirby, J.) (“If there be any ambiguity or uncertainty about the state of our
common law it is, in my opinion, permissible for this Court to seek to resolve the ambiguity or uncertainty with the assistance of the applicable international law of human
rights.”) (emphasis added). See discussion in Walker, supra note 89, at 95.
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C. Why Do Different Legal Systems Select Different Incorporation
Strategies?
The question of what considerations underlie the choice of an incorporation regime is essentially a political theory topic (e.g., the choice relates to the cosmopolitan or isolationist nature of the relevant society)
that exceeds the scope of the present Article. However, a few rudimentary observations may be offered at this stage.
First, the older the constitutional instrument is, the more developed is
the idiosyncratic jurisprudence relating to its interpretation. As a result,
courts construing such primordial instruments are expected to be less
receptive to engaging new interpretive materials derived from IHR law
than are courts operating in relatively new constitutional orders, which
were often influenced by IHR law during their formation. A second factor is the degree of confidence domestic courts have in their ability to
deliver justice. Well-established democracies might view the introduction of additional safeguards to their constitutional order as redundant,
while new states and states emerging from non-democratic experiences
might feel that such reliance is beneficial and involves a legitimizing effect, which could protect them from future backsliding.114 Third, it appears that domestic courts subject to an international system of review,
such as the ECtHR, would be keener to harmonize domestic law, including CL, with IHR law, than would courts of countries not subject to similar oversight.115 The desire to avoid embarrassing adverse findings, as
well as the ongoing inter-judicial dialogue between national and international courts and the accelerated transnational legal process that ensues,
serve as powerful incentives to pay close attention to IHR requirements.116
Finally, the inclination to resort to IHR law in constitutional interpretation is sometimes judge-dependent. In some common law legal systems,
individual judges play a pivotal role in promoting the integration of IHR
into the CL discourse. Consequently, a variety of factors relating to the
judges’ cultural or educational background, idiosyncratic beliefs, values
and exposure to the IHR law discourse could also be relevant to the out-

114. Goodman, supra note 60, at 541 (national systems with discredited human rights
records try to “lock in liberal gains” through accession to international instruments and
procedures, with greater perceived legitimacy); Neuman, supra note 6, at 85.
115. Cf. Neuman, supra note 6, at 86.
116. See Slaughter, supra note 103, at 61–62; Buergenthal, supra note 5, at 361, 394
(availability of appeals to international tribunals affects the attitude of courts towards
non-incorporated IHR treaties).
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come.117 Of course, an explicit constitutional provision mandating courts
to consult IHR norms neutralizes many of these subjective elements and
sends courts a clear message on the political desirability of invoking IHR
law. This is why constitutionally-based canons of interpretation offer
better prospects for increasing the influence of IHR treaties on constitutional interpretation than judge-made interpretive doctrines.
IV. IS CONSTITUTIONALIZING HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES A GOOD IDEA?
THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF INCORPORATION
The practice of the surveyed common law countries reveals skepticism,
reluctance, and sometimes outright hostility on the part of domestic
judges to the idea of incorporating IHR treaty standards into the national
system of constitutional guarantees. The explicit and implicit resistance
to incorporation of IHR norms into constitutional texts cannot be simply
dismissed as a manifestation of hostility to internationalism on the part of
domestic courts; neither is the issue subsumed in the ordinary monism
versus dualism debate. On the contrary, there are discrete arguments,
supported by scholarly work, which challenge the applicability of IHR
norms to the CL discourse that ought to be confronted. These arguments
can be grouped into four categories: a) separation of powers and democratic accountability concerns, b) fears of undermining legal coherence, c)
cultural objections, and d) political reluctance to implement IHR law.
The following Part discusses these objections and introduces counterarguments in favor of applying IHR law as an influential interpretative
tool that should inform the contents of domestic CL. Hence, policy arguments relating to the welfare of the surveyed domestic legal systems
independently support the incorporation of IHR treaties into CL in a way
that supplements the international law arguments presented in Part I.
Before delving into the specific arguments and counter-arguments, two
premises of the discussion undertaken in this Part ought to be acknowledged. First, the interpretive methodology here recommended accepts the
ultimate supremacy of CL in national courts, a concession which leaves
in place the conditions for chronic conflicts in outcome between domestic and international judicial fora.118 This approach skirts many of the
virtually insoluble theoretical debates over hierarchy of norms (e.g.,
whether international law is the source of legitimacy of national law or
117. These considerations comport with the transnational legal process literature,
which views the projection of ideas and values across national borders through global
interaction and discourse as a central factor in ensuring compliance with international
law. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 97, at 56.
118. Note that under international law, reliance upon domestic law can never justify a
violation of international obligations. VCLT, supra note 7, art. 27.
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vice versa),119 and advocates a role for international law even in conditions of limited applicability. Needless to say, arguments in support of
the incorporation of IHR law into CL would apply a fortiori under a monistic paradigm, which fully integrates national and international law and
accords the latter precedence over the former.
Another premise is the rejection of originalism or interpretivism—i.e.,
theories which preclude construing CL instruments in light of any postconstitutional legal source, including IHR law120—as the sole bases for
constitutional interpretation projects.
In the alternative, the following three general propositions are put forward: (1) binding legal sources, which have legal effect within national
legal systems, ought to be harmonized with one another through norm
interpretation;121 (2) constitutional interpretation projects should, generally speaking, share similar pro-harmonizing aims;122 and (3) interpreta-

119. As is well known, there are two main theories and, consequently, practical approaches to the relations between national and international law. Monism advocates the
integration of international and national law, while dualism supports the separate existence of the two legal orders. Ultimately, the two theories differ in identifying the source
of legitimacy of law. Traditionally, monism posits that all legal norms derive from a single source—a common gründnorm. Indeed, according to Kelsen, national legal systems
derive their ultimate legitimacy from the principle of sovereignty, which is a fundamental
principle of customary international law. See HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW
AND STATE 369 (Anders Wedberg trans., 1949); HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW
337–38 (Max Knight trans., 1967); HANS KELSEN, INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF
LEGAL THEORY 61–62 (Bonnie Litschewski Paulson & Stanley L. Paulson trans., Oxford
Univ. Press 1992) (1934). In contrast, dualism views domestic laws and institutions as
deriving their authority exclusively from a self-contained domestic legal system, corresponding to a sovereign polity, founded upon its own independent gründnorm. As a result, domestic courts can apply international law only to the degree it was positively imported into the domestic legal system through domestic rules of incorporation. A third
pluralist approach that dismisses any pretensions to identify a common starting point for
law and advocates a multi-faceted vision of law, is also available. See, e.g., William
Ewald, Comment on MacCormick, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1071, 1078 (1997); Neil MacCormick, Institutions and Laws Again, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1429, 1432 (1999).
120. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 1 (1980) (“[Interpretivism
indicates] that judges deciding constitutional issues should confine themselves to enforcing norms that are stated or clearly implicit in the written Constitution.”). But see Hughlett, supra note 15, at 181.
121. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 116–17 (1977). The
proposition that interpretation should strive to harmonize applicable norms might even
qualify as a general principle of law given its ubiquitous application. See Statute of the
International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(1)(c), 59 Stat. 1031, 1946 U.K.T.S.
67.
122. Aharon Barak, A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 77 (2002) (“The purposive interpreter does not look for
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tion of constitutional texts should take cognizance of changing social
values, pursuant to “living constitution” theories accepted in the surveyed jurisdictions.123 These propositions could, in theory, facilitate the
consideration of IHR treaties in the course of CL interpretive projects. If
IHR treaties form part of domestic law by virtue of a domestic law rule
of incorporation, then they may be viewed under propositions (1) and (2)
as candidates for harmonization with CL. In the alternative, treaty ratification by democratically elected bodies could be viewed as manifestation
of the relevant polity’s social values and deemed relevant for CL interpretation projects under proposition (3).124
A. Upsetting the Separation of Powers and Undermining Democratic
Accountability
A traditional objection against empowering courts to resort to international treaties when construing constitutional texts is that such authorization might disrupt fundamental constitutional principles.125 These include
the need to maintain the separation of powers (or the constitutional balance of powers) within the relevant polity126 and to resist any democratic
accountability-eroding features which appertain to a pro-incorporation
rule. The following segment analyzes the distinct claims which comprise
this group of anti-incorporation arguments.
1. Fears of Judicial Activism
Two specific separation of powers issues may arise. The ability of
courts to step outside of the ‘four corners’ of the text and to fill an existing normative cast with contents derived from international law sources
liberates judges from the obligation to abide by the original intent of the
norm’s drafters. This necessarily amplifies their law-creating role, which

conflicts; he aims for harmony.”); LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING
THE CONSTITUTION 109 (1991).

123. See, e.g., Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 307 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(“We are construing a living Constitution.”). See also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John
Ferejohn, Super Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1268 (2001); Neuman, supra note 4, at
1872.
124. See, e.g., Baker v. Canada, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, 861 (Can.).
125. See, e.g., Jamil Jaffer, Congressional Control over Treaty Interpretation, 70 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1093, 1097 (2003); Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources to Interpret the Constitution, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 57, 57–58 (2004) (“Including a new source
fundamentally destabilizes the equilibrium of constitutional decision making.”).
126. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 861.
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is inherent in any law-interpretation or law-application project,127 and
provides rhetorical tools which enable judges to mask their individual
preferences with innovative interpretative doctrines.128 This criticism is
particularly influential at the CL level. If judges are entrusted with the de
facto authority to reshape the constitution, they might be able to override
with greater frequency and intrusiveness democratically elected legislatures and executives. Hence, objections to the use of IHR law for the interpretation of CL are directly linked to fears of judicial activism and
theories of constitutional interpretation that seek to curb judicial discretion.129
These objections are hardly convincing. First, it is questionable
whether empowering judges to apply IHR treaties when construing constitutional texts liberates judges or, rather, constrains them. Most modern
theories of constitutional interpretation refer judges to elusive concepts
such as “local standards of decency,” “national consensus,” “original
intent,” “basic principles of the legal system,” “basic rights” and “justice,”130 which leave judges almost unrestricted interpretive discretion.131
The image of the work of the judiciary as a mechanical law-applying
exercise or the automatic identification and implementation of the original drafters’ intent, involving little discretion, is nothing more than a
dated myth.132 One could, therefore, argue that reference to the more precise legal standards found in IHR instruments and the case law of international monitoring bodies restricts the ability of judges to mold consti127. See, e.g., Buergenthal, supra note 5, at 361 (observing that criteria for application
of the presumption of compliance “are subjective and easily manipulated, allowing the
courts a great deal of latitude to impose their own preferences”).
128. Bradley, supra note 95, at 506 (“Canons may also promote activism, some critics
argue, by allowing judges to use ostensibly value-free rules to hide their true policy considerations.”); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 309
(1996) (observing that canons of construction are “fig leaves covering decisions reached
on other grounds”).
129. See, e.g., Int’l Transport Roth GmbH v. Sec’y of State for Home Dep’t, [2003]
Q.B. 728, 758 (U.K.) (Brown, L.J.) (“[T]he court’s task is to distinguish between legislation and interpretation, and confine itself to the latter. We cannot create a wholly different
scheme . . . . That must be for Parliament itself.”).
130. See, e.g., 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 67 (1998) (“Whenever language is
not explicit, or admits of doubt, it is presumed that it is intended to be in accordance with
the acknowledged principles of justice and liberty. . . .”).
131. David M. Beatty, The Forms and Limits of Constitutional Interpretation, 49 AM.
J. COMP. L. 79, 99 (2001) (“Interpretivism sanctions a process of reasoning which puts
each judge at the center of the case and gives them unfettered discretion to chose [sic]
which approach to take.”). See also Bradley, supra note 95, at 505 (discussing criticisms
of the use of canons in statutory interpretation for failing to restrain judicial discretion).
132. See discussion in Bradley, supra note 95, at 506; Hughlett, supra note 15, at 182.
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tutional texts in accordance with their idiosyncratic personal or institutional preferences.133 At the very least, reference to international law
helps judges to articulate their preferences in a politically acceptable
manner134 and provides them with guidance in cases where they do not
have strong preferences.135
Second, the fact that accession to international treaties is executed
through the fiat of other branches of government (the executive, the legislative or both) implies that these branches can influence judicial discretion by way of treaty ratification.136 Such influence is augmented by the
widely accepted rule that courts should give weight to the way in which
the executive branch interprets treaties.137 The result is that the presump133. In Re Pub. Serv. Employee Relations Act (Alta.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313, 349 (Can.)
(Dickson, C.J., dissenting) (“As the Canadian judiciary approaches the often general and
open textured language of the Charter, ‘the more detailed textual provisions of the treaties
may aid in supplying content to such imprecise concepts as the right to life, freedom of
association, and even the right to counsel.’”) (citation omitted). See also Hughlett, supra
note 15, at 180 (“[E]ven reasonable people disagree on how the Supreme Court should
interpret the Constitution. Some external interpretive tool is necessary at times to resolve
constitutional questions.”); Neuman, supra note 6, at 90 (noting that proscribing the use
of international law as an interpretive aid would hardly prevent judicial activism);
Strossen, supra note 6, at 830.
134. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1200 (2005) (“The opinion of the
world community, while not controlling our outcome, does provide respected
and significant confirmation for our own conclusions.”).
135. See, e.g., Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 993 (2002) (“Just as ‘attention to the
judgment of other nations’ can help Congress determine ‘the justice and propriety of
[America’s] measures,’ so it can help guide this Court when it decides whether a particular punishment violates the Eighth Amendment.”) (citation omitted). Cf. Bradley, supra
note 95, at 508 (discussing defenses of canons of interpretation as useful for articulating
policy preferences); Neuman, supra note 4, at 1896 (“[T]he availability of external
precedents offers guidance in interpreting constitutional rights, and may bolster the authority of the reviewing court against other political forces.”).
136. Cf. Bradley, supra note 95, at 525 (“[The presumption of conformity] is a means
by which the courts can seek guidance from the political branches concerning whether
and, if so, how they intend to violate the international legal obligations of the United
States.”); Kirby, supra note 89, at 16.
137. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184–85 (1982) (“Although
not conclusive, the meaning attributed to treaty provisions by the Government agencies
charged with their negotiation and enforcement is entitled to great weight.”); Kolovrat v.
Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961) (courts ascribe great weight to the meaning given to
treaties by departments of government charged with negotiation and enforcement). See
also Jaffer, supra note 125, at 1099–1100; Bradley, supra note 95, at 532; Eyal Benvenisti, Judicial Misgivings Regarding the Application of International Law: An Analysis
of the Attitudes of National Courts, 4 EUR. J. INT’L L. 159, 167–68 (1993); Eskridge &
Frickey, supra note 93, at 618. There are of course limits to the degree in which the legislature or the executive can restrict judicial discretion regarding the interpretation of trea-
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tion of conformity, even when applied at the CL level, protects the power
of the political branches of government to conduct effective foreign policy by minimizing the number of judicially created conflicts between
domestic law and international law. By contrast, courts’ application of
CL without considering IHR law might result in treaty violations and
could complicate international relations. In this respect, incorporation of
IHR treaties into CL serves to strengthen rather than undermine the balance of powers between the branches of government.138
2. Empowerment of Treaty-Ratifying Agencies
A second separation of powers concern relates to the expected increase
in the power of treaty-ratifying agencies. If courts are required to construe the constitution in an international law-friendly manner, the domestic actors directly involved in the creation of the international law binding upon the relevant polity—mainly, by negotiating and acceding to
international treaties—become exceptionally empowered. By making
new international law, these actors can indirectly affect the meaning of
their national constitution and increase their relative power at the expense of the other branches of government.139 In other words, recourse to
international law under direct or indirect incorporation theories provides
a detour to constitutional amendment procedures that enables a small,
and perhaps conjectural, political majority in one branch of government
to place its stamp upon constitutional instruments, which ought to reflect
deeply imbedded social tenets not susceptible to temporal vagrancies.140
Such a development is also arguably awkward from a theoretical perspective. It enables the same entities whose power is checked by the constitution to tamper with the very means of control, thereby undermining
the hierarchical superiority of CL.141
Nonetheless, this argument carries little weight in jurisdictions such as
the United States and most civil law legal systems, where virtually all

ties. Cf. Jaffer, supra note 125, at 1104–10; Buergenthal, supra note 5, at 347–48 (the
French Conseil d’Etat may interpret treaties independently of the interpretations of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs).
138. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 95, at 525–26 (the presumption of conformity reduces the number of violations which are contrary to the wishes of the political
branches); Kirby, supra note 89, at 15 (“Far from being a negation of sovereignty, this is
an application of it . . . .”).
139. Alford, supra note 125, at 61.
140. See, e.g., Kirby, supra note 89, at 13 (“[Treaties negotiated by the Executive
Government] may or may not reflect the will of the people, expressed by their representatives in Parliament . . . .”); Walker, supra note 89, at 98–99.
141. Alford, supra note 125, at 62.
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branches of government are involved in the process of treaty ratification
and incorporation. The executive negotiates the treaty and submits it for
ratification; the legislative branch is free to give or withhold its consent;
and the judiciary is invested with the authority to oversee the implementation of international instruments within the domestic legal system.142
The checks and balances inherent in the process seem to facilitate the
maintenance of the pre-existing institutional equilibrium.143
Still, one must acknowledge that a more serious separation of powers
problem might arise in common law states, such as the United Kingdom,
Canada, Australia or Israel, where ratification of international treaties is
the prerogative of the executive branch. In such states, incorporating
treaties into CL not only sidesteps the normal constitutional amendment
process, but it also circumvents the normal legislative process. Through
treaty ratification, the executive branch can influence CL and encourage
interpretations thereof that override statutory instruments adopted by the
legislative branch.144 In addition, incorporation by interpretation might
result in granting international treaties binding effect in the domestic legal system through the backdoor, in contravention of the dominant dualistic paradigm applicable in these countries.145 Arguably, these develop-

142. For example, judges may determine whether the treaty is self-executing or nonself-executing, what is the precise meaning of the treaty terms, and how to best reconcile
treaty norms with the existing constitutional text.
143. One could also argue that, in theory, any interpretation of the constitution influenced by IHR law could be reversed by constitutional amendments introduced by nonjudicial branches of government. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, International Law, Sovereignty, and American Constitutionalism: Reflections on the Customary International Law
Debate, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 91, 95 (2004). However, in reality the process of constitutional
amendment might be prohibitively cumbersome.
144. The following passage describes the problem:
[T]he submission by HREOC would undermine the long settled principle that
provisions of an international treaty do not form part of Australian law unless
validly incorporated by statute. It has repeatedly been held that the separation
of the legislative and executive arms of government necessitates that treaties be
implemented domestically under statute. However, HREOC’s approach would
effectively reverse that principle. By giving priority to the principles assumed
by the Executive, by permitting judges to construe legislation in a way that violated the intention of Parliament, it would elevate the Executive to a position
that it has never enjoyed under our Constitution. That is another reason for rejecting the submission.
Western Australia v. Ward (2002) 213 C.L.R. 1, 391–92 (Austl.) (Callinan, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
145. Justice Iacobucci of Canada’s Supreme Court encapsulates this argument:
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ments might adversely affect the existing system of checks and balances
between the different branches of government.146
It would seem that such countries warrant a nuanced rule of incorporation, which would enable the judiciary to maintain the inter-institutional
balance of power. Since the weight attributed to IHR treaties in the
course of CL interpretation is always relative, courts should be entitled to
consider the compatibility of international standards with their own domestic constitutional concepts and notions of justice. If, on balance,
judges believe that incorporation of IHR treaty norms will corrupt or disrupt the constitutional order within the relevant polity, they should be
able to reject them (although this might put their country in breach of
international law).147 Courts thus serve as important filtering agencies,
supervising the constitutional lawfulness and desirability of giving effect
to treaty obligations entered into by the executive.

[The approach advocating a role for unincorporated IHR treaties in construing
the Charter] is not in accordance with the Court’s jurisprudence concerning the
status of international law within the domestic legal system.
In my view, one should proceed with caution in deciding matters of this nature,
lest we adversely affect the balance maintained by our Parliamentary tradition,
or inadvertently grant the executive the power to bind citizens without the necessity of involving the legislative branch . . . . [T]he result will be that the appellant is able to achieve indirectly what cannot be achieved directly, namely,
to give force and effect within the domestic legal system to international obligations undertaken by the executive alone that have yet to be subject to the democratic will of Parliament.
Baker v. Canada, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, 865–66 (Iacobucci, J., concurring). See also Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd. v. Commonwealth (1997) 190 C.L.R. 513, 657 (Austl.) (Kirby,
J., concurring) (“[T]he Court [should not] adopt an interpretive principle as a means of
introducing, by the backdoor, provisions of international treaties or other international
law concerning fundamental rights not yet incorporated into Australian domestic law.”).
One may question, however, the consistency of Kirby’s approach, as in the same case he
relied upon the non-incorporated Universal Declaration on Human Rights, notwithstanding that, in Australia, customary law is not part of the law of the land without incorporation. See Walker, supra note 89, at 87. A comparable argument could be made in the
United States in relation to non-self-executing treaties. Their incorporation to CL allegedly bypasses the rule concerning their lack of direct effect.
146. See, e.g., Benvenisti, supra note 137, at 174.
147. Compare the German Constitutional Court doctrine that EC law would not be
given effect if it is proved that it fails to guarantee an absolute minimum of protection for
fundamental rights (“ausbrechenden Gemeinschaftsakt”). Bundesverfassungsgericht
[BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 11, 1993, 2 BvR 2134/92 & 2159/92, translated in [1994] 1 C.M.L.R. 57, 89; Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] June 7, 2000, 2 BvL 1/97, excerpts translated in GEORGE A. BERMANN ET
AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN UNION LAW 321 (2d ed. 2002).
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Notwithstanding, it should be emphasized that distinct policy considerations—the inherent persuasiveness of IHR treaties, their straightforward adaptability at the CL level and the duty to effectively incorporate
them into domestic law—support the incorporation of IHR treaties in all
legal systems, even at the price of a minor shift in the inter-branch balance of power. These considerations apply with special force to IHR
treaty norms endowed with customary international law status because
such norms usually reflect deeply imbedded and widely supported interests and values. The international consensus underlying customary norms
is often indicative of their inherent persuasiveness and legitimacy.148 In
addition, the method of creation of customary law is more pluralist from
a domestic perspective as it builds upon the practice of all branches of
government. No single government can create customary law at will and,
as a result, purposefully circumvent ordinary constitutional or legislative
processes.149 Hence, erosion of the separation of powers principle as a
result of incorporating IHR treaties that also reflect customary standards
is minimal.
3. Accountability-Eroding Implications
A pro-incorporation CL interpretive rule empowering non-elected
judges and government officials at the expense of parliaments and constitutional assemblies might also be viewed as incompatible with notions of
popular sovereignty.150 Skepticism directed against such accountabilitydecreasing measures might therefore be justified.151 The democratic defi-

148. Similar arguments could be made in support of attributing increased persuasive
weight to widely-ratified IHR treaties. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964) (“[T]he greater the degree of codification or consensus concerning a particular area of international law, the more appropriate it is for the judiciary
to render decisions regarding it . . . .”); Slaight Commc’ns Inc. v. Davidson, [1989] 1
S.C.R. 1038, 1056–57 (Can.) (“[T]he fact that a value has the status of an international
human right, either in customary international law or under a treaty to which Canada is a
State Party, should generally be indicative of a high degree of importance attached to that
objective.”).
149. For discussion, see Walker, supra note 89, at 100–01.
150. Cf. Aleinikoff, supra note 143, at 101 (arguing that customary international law is
in tension with popular sovereignty).
151. Cf. Alford, supra note 9, at 785 (arguing that, in the case of the death penalty, the
international majoritarian consensus, which seeks enforcement through the courts, conflicts with the domestic majoritarian consensus of the United States); Alford, supra note
125, at 59 (discussing the “international countermajoritarian difficulty”); Goldsmith,
supra note 36, at 333; Kirby, supra note 89, at 15 (“[Judicial creativity] must not undermine the primacy of democratic law-making by the organs of government, directly or
indirectly accountable to the people . . . .”); Aleinikoff, supra note 143, at 93 (discussing
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cit associated with a pro-incorporation rule is also reflected in the record
of the surveyed states, which often reveals inadequate levels of public
debate on the desirability of ratifying IHR treaties in general, and on the
implications of such ratification on the CL discourse in particular.152 This
lack of accountability is exacerbated in federal states such as the United
States, Canada or Australia,153 where expanding the substantive scope of
application of the constitution by way of IHR-compatible interpretation
might infringe upon the rights and interests of the constitutive federal
units.154 Since the interests of these units might be unrepresented or underrepresented in the treaty ratification process, political pressures
against incorporation could escalate.155
The accountability-eroding argument is also unpersuasive. Once it is
established that incorporation of IHR treaties into CL does not result in
judicial empowerment (in fact, one could argue that the presumption of

critiques of customary international law as an extraconstitutional norm binding democractic branches of the government).
152. Kirby, supra note 89, at 13.
153. Cf. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 857–58 (discussing the deficit of state
representation when international customary law is applied by courts as federal common
law); Anne Bayefsky & Joan Fitzpatrick, International Human Rights Law in United
States Courts: A Comparative Perspective, 14 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 82–89 (1992); Lea
Brilmayer, Federalism, State Authority and the Preemptive Power of International Law,
1994 SUP. CT. REV. 295, 307–08, 322–26, 329–332 (1994); Kirby, supra note 89, at 14.
154. A classic example demonstrating the potential of international law to manipulate
the balance of power between the center and the periphery in a federal state is Missouri v.
Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). In that case, the U.S. administration bypassed a constitutional ban on the regulation of migratory bird hunting through federal legislation, through
the conclusion of an international treaty on the same matter with Great Britain. Id. at
432–33. This sort of consideration has led the United States to introduce in the process of
ratification of the ICCPR a “federalism understanding,” subjecting the implementation of
the Covenant to the distribution of power among the federal and constitutive states. See
Brad R. Roth, Understanding the “Understanding”: Federalism Constraints on Human
Rights Implementation, 47 WAYNE L. REV. 891 (2001).
155. In Canada and Australia, the federal government is authorized to ratify treaties
without involvement of the regional units; in the United States, the ratification process
normally involves the Senate and the President. Cf. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 16,
at 868 (arguing that state interests are not represented in the application of international
customary law by federal judges). Under U.S. constitutional law, the President may also
enter independently into “executive agreements.” See LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 215 (2d ed. 1996) (observing that presidential authority to
enter into these agreements continues to be debated); Sharon G. Hyman, Executive
Agreements: Beyond Constitutional Limits?, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 805, 822–32 (1983)
(discussing the constitutional bases for executive agreements). This, however, bears little
relevance to the present topic as human rights treaties have been traditionally subject to
the ordinary ratification process.
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conformity restricts judicial discretion),156 the objection, insofar as it relates to judicial non-accountability, fails. In any case, arguments against
judicial empowerment run contrary to the notion that, in the area of human rights protection, judges bear a special responsibility for protecting
individuals and minorities from the tyranny of the majority.157 Hence,
even if judges were to become empowered by a pro-incorporation legal
doctrine which governs IHR treaties, this would not necessarily conflict
with democratic principles.158
Furthermore, the claim that a pro-incorporation interpretive presumption might lead to the circumvention of more popularly representative
constitutional amendment procedures is oblivious to the law-creating
quality of any interpretive project. Expanding the range of permissible
sources for interpretation of CL texts hardly changes the nature of the
interpretive process. In other words, CL interpretation necessarily implies a degree of innovation regardless of whether courts resort to IHR
treaties or not. Further, one should realize that constitutional instruments
which entrench the political choices of past majorities also have inherent
democratic deficit problems.159 Mechanisms which facilitate the periodic
updating of constitutional texts in light of contemporary political choices,
expressed, inter alia, through treaty ratification, could thus have a positive accountability-enhancing effect.
Similar observations would also mitigate the aforementioned concern
that incorporation of IHR treaties into CL might disrupt the federal division of powers in some countries.160 In effect, the federal argument cuts
156. Beatty, supra note 131, at 100–01.
157. Cf. Ann I. Park, Comment, Human Rights and Basic Needs: Using International
Human Rights Norms to Inform Constitutional Interpretation, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1195,
1250 (1987) (“[T]he government which is shaped by majoritarian political processes
cannot be trusted to safeguard human rights through law.”); A v. Sec’y of State, [2005] 2
A.C. 68, para. 42 (U.K.) (“[T]he function of independent judges charged to interpret and
apply the law is universally recognised as a cardinal feature of the modern democratic
state . . . .”).
158. See, e.g., Spiro, supra note 62, at 2023; Kirby, supra note 89, at 16 (“[I]n so far as
courts give effect at least to fundamental rights, they are assisting in the discharge of their
governmental functions to advance the complex notion of democracy as it is now understood . . . .”).
159. Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 123, at 1267.
160. In addition, it may be claimed that the influence of federal actors upon the division of powers between the federation and its components through treaty ratification is
not radically different from their influence upon theses relations through federal legislation (which is also a generally permissible source of input in the CL interpretive process)
or executive practices. Cf. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 865 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (referring to the merits of reliance upon legislation when construing CL). In
federal countries, such as the United States, where the Senate comprises of delegates
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in both ways. The promotion of international law at the CL level will
ensure that constitutive federal units would not have the freedom to violate the international obligations of the federation.161 This comports with
the organizing principle of most federal states, according to which the
central authorities—and not the federal units—are invested with exclusive power to conduct foreign relations on behalf of the federal polity.162
Interpreting the constitution in accordance with the international obligations of the federation reinforces this principle, whereas failure to consider the same obligations undermines it and complicates the ability of
the central government to adequately perform at the international level.163
4. Empowering International Adjudicators
A final accountability concern that needs to be addressed involves the
impact of the case law of treaty-monitoring bodies under a proincorporation rule. According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, international treaties ought to be construed, inter alia, in light of
the practice of the parties thereto.164 One manifestation of such practice,
growing in its importance, is the work of treaty-monitoring bodies such
as the ECtHR and the UN Human Rights Committee (HRC). Indeed,
when discussing IHR treaties, domestic courts increasingly refer to the
jurisprudence of such bodies.165 Incorporation of IHR treaties into CL
would thus, most probably, facilitate the importation of the work of infrom the States of the Union, these concerns are even less significant, as the interests of
the constitutive units may be represented during the treaty ratification process (which is
conditioned upon a two-thirds super majority—a requirement which compensates, in part,
for the under-representation of some federal units in Senate).
161. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964) (noting Prof.
Philip C. Jessup’s caution that “rules of international law should not be left to divergent
and perhaps parochial state interpretations”).
162. See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 18, at 1964 (“[T]he Constitution divests the states of
any power in the field [of international agreements].”). See also Bradley, supra note 95,
at 525; Aleinikoff, supra note 143, at 94 (discussing the internationalist argument that
international law cases constitute one area where federal common law survives the Erie
doctrine because “they concern a preeminently federal interest”).
163. A parallel argument was raised with regard to the impact of the Charming Betsy
doctrine upon division of powers between the legislature and the executive. Alford, supra
note 9, at 733–34.
164. VCLT, supra note 7, art. 31(3)(b).
165. See, e.g., S v Makwanyane 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) para. 35 (S. Afr.) (Chaskalson, J.) (“[D]ecisions of tribunals dealing with comparable instruments, such as the
United Nations Committee on Human Rights, . . . and in appropriate cases, reports of
specialised agencies such as the International Labour Organisation may provide guidance
as to the correct interpretation of particular provisions of Chapter 3 [of the South African
Constitution].”). See discussion in Slaughter, supra note 103, at 67–69.
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ternational human rights bodies into the constitutional interpretive process. This, in turn, might empower non-popularly elected international
bodies at the expense of directly accountable domestic legislators and
drafters of the constitution.166
This argument, couched in somewhat more general terms, has been addressed in a recent article written by Professor Mark Tushnet.167 Tushnet
persuasively argued that treaty language that confers the power to settle
disputes to an international tribunal (such as the WTO Appellate Body)
presents no constitutional problem under U.S. CL, since the power of the
President and Congress to create obligations for the Union also encompasses the power to undertake open-ended and dynamic obligations.168
Further, the mediating role of domestic judges in interpreting and applying such decisions in domestic legal contexts mitigates any alleged loss
of sovereignty.169
While Tushnet’s general argument is valid, delegation of judicial authority is even less of a problem in the IHR sphere, at least with respect
to the surveyed countries. This is because most of the relevant IHR
monitoring bodies—the HRC, which state parties have normally met
with approval, and other UN treaty bodies—do not have the authority to
generate binding decisions. Hence, domestic courts may derogate from
their views if deemed necessary, although the high quality of the decisions, the fairness of the procedure, the expertise of the Committee
members and the acceptance of the decisions by other parties could generate considerable compliance pull.170 The ECtHR is, of course, a differ166. Goldsmith, supra note 36, at 333; Barak, supra note 122, at 162 (the international
judge is less accountable than the domestic judge); Ramsey, supra note 98, at 79.
167. Mark Tushnet, Transnational/Domestic Constitutional Law, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
239 (2003).
168. Id. at 253–57.
169. Id.
170. As the Federal Court of Australia has stated:
Although the views of the Committee lack precedential authority in an Australian court, it is legitimate to have regard to them as the opinions of an expert
body established by the treaty to further its objects by performing functions that
include reporting, receiving reports, conciliating and considering claims that a
State Party is not fulfilling its obligations. The Committee’s functions under the
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to
which Australia has acceded (effective as of 25 December 1991) are particularly relevant in this respect. They include receiving, considering and expressing a view about claims by individuals that a State Party to the Protocol has
violated covenanted rights.
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v. Al Masri (2003)
126 F.C.R. 54, 91. See also Queen v. Sin Yau-Ming, [1992] 1 H.K.C.L.R. 127, 141
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ent matter, as its decisions are legally binding upon parties litigating before it,171 but carry no stare decisis effect vis-à-vis third parties. However, the only country surveyed in this article which is subject to its jurisdiction, the United Kingdom, may exercise considerable judicial, executive and legislative discretion in determining the effect of such judgments within its legal system.172 In short, fears concerning the power of
IHR monitoring bodies to dictate the contents of domestic law, much less
of CL, seem to be exaggerated.
Finally, it could also be argued that the wide international consensus
underlying most IHR norms and the international jurisprudence relating
to their application provides some degree of international accountability
and legitimacy which supports adherence to these standards.173 While
this does not entirely alleviate the concerns of those lamenting the erosion of domestic accountability as a result of the internationalization of
the CL discourse, it does reduce the risk of arbitrariness introduced by
domestic judges during CL interpretation processes.174
B. Fears of Undermining Legal Coherence
Another concern raised by opponents of incorporation is that the introduction of international law at the CL level might disrupt the existing
legal discourse and create disharmonizing tensions.175 Incorporation
would require the importation into the domestic legal system of foreign
normative concepts that are not based upon local notions of justice and
specific social structures. Differences between national and international
(C.A.) (H.K.). Cf. Alford, supra note 9, at 756–59 (noting, however, that deference to the
rulings of international tribunals is entirely within the discretion of the domestic court).
For a discussion of the link between perceived legitimacy and compliance pull, see
THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 48–49 (1990).
171. European HR Convention, supra note 22, art. 46.
172. Section 2 of the Human Rights Act instructs British courts to take into account the
decisions of the Strasbourg institutions, including ECtHR judgments in the process of
interpreting Convention rights. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 2. This seems to guarantee the status of domestic courts as final arbiters as to the application of ECtHR judgments within domestic law.
173. See, e.g., Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd. v. Commonwealth (1997) 190 C.L.R. 513,
658 (Austl.) (Kirby, J., concurring) (“The reason for this [resort to IHR law] is that the
Constitution not only speaks to the people of Australia who made it and accept it for their
governance. It also speaks to the international community as the basic law of the Australian nation which is a member of that community.”); Spiro, supra note 62, at 2021–22;
Hughlett, supra note 15, at 181; Aleinikoff, supra note 143, at 105 (“[I]t is a state’s compliance with fundamental norms of human rights that establishes its legitimacy at home
and abroad.”).
174. See Goodman, supra note 60, at 541.
175. Alford, supra note 125, at 57–58.
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law—from differences in legal drafting techniques to differences in the
methods of balancing competing social interests—further complicate
integration efforts.176 For example, IHR law might require a more intrusive standard of governmental involvement in social life (through the
introduction of positive human rights obligations) than what is acceptable within a given society.177 The introduction of such far-reaching reforms through judicial action, without correlative changes in the structure
and machinery of government, might be ineffective and disruptive. When
linked to the argument addressed below regarding the lack of familiarity
of domestic judges with IHR law, the formidability of the task of incorporation becomes apparent. Arguably, a more prudent course of action
would be to encourage legislators and other constitutional actors to
gradually introduce constitutional amendments necessary to meet the
state’s international obligations.178 Such a process would not only meet
separation of powers and accountability concerns,179 but it would also
ensure smoother integration of international norms into the domestic legal system.
This group of arguments is also untenable. The opposition’s arguments
are premised on a dubious image of a uniform and harmonious lawcreating mechanism which international law allegedly subverts. In truth,
domestic norms are generated over time by different individual lawmakers and a variety of social institutions, such as constitutional assemblies, federal legislatures, provincial legislatures, courts, and administrative agencies. In some legal systems, customs, such as lex mercatoria,
and religious edicts also apply.180 Consequently, courts are wellaccustomed to harmonizing assorted norms derived from diverse sources
and coming in different shapes and forms, such as statutes, judicial decisions, administrative orders, etc. It is difficult to see why the introduction
of international law, especially of treaty norms which the state has freely
chosen to ratify—a fact suggesting a good fit between the treaty norms
and domestic notions of justice—should be treated in a radically different
manner.

176. See Goldsmith, supra note 36, at 332; Hughlett, supra note 15, at 180 (“There are
differences between the way the courts in the United States have defined rights and the
way international agreements define those rights.”); Louis Henkin, International Human
Rights and Rights in the United States, in 1 HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 25, 51–53 (Theodor Meron ed., 1984).
177. Christenson, supra note 18, at 242.
178. Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 123, at 1271–72.
179. Goldsmith, supra note 36, at 334.
180. For example, in Israel, religious law governs personal status matters (marriage,
divorce and many associated legal issues).
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The disharmony argument is particularly weak with regard to norms of
international law which have already been incorporated within the domestic legal system as part of the law of the land by virtue of incorporating legislation or a general constitutional rule. In such cases, courts are
expected to apply international norms directly and to synchronize their
application with other legal norms.181 It would be odd to exclude international law norms endowed with direct effect within the national legal
system from the purview of CL interpretation, while, at the same time,
factoring in other domestic law sources, such as domestic legislation.182
However, even where ratified IHR treaties are not part of the law of the
land—either by reason of their non-self-executing character or because
of a dualistic constitutional rule of incorporation—important policy considerations related to the promotion of legal coherence support harmonizing CL with such treaties. The first and foremost consideration is that
harmonization could avoid some of the political costs incurred by the
state on the international plane by reason of inconsistencies between its
domestic law and international obligations. These costs might include
formal or informal sanctions, reputation costs (e.g., public shaming), and
the risk of deteriorating relations with other members of the international
community.183 As argued in Part I, failure to harmonize IHR treaties into
CL might even constitute an independent violation of these treaties. It
thus seems sensible to encourage courts to opt for an interpretive methodology that reduces these costs by way of harmonization.
Another consideration is that IHR treaties that have been accepted by
democratically elected actors—members of the government or the legis-

181. See Jaffer, supra note 125, at 1099.
182. And yet, that is exactly what the following passage espouses:
The most reliable objective signs [for identifying evolving standards of decency
in constitutional cases] consist of the legislation that the society has enacted. It
will rarely if ever be the case that the Members of this Court will have a better
sense of the evolution in views of the American people than do their elected
representatives.
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 865 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369–73 (Scalia, J.) (reviewing a variety of State capital
punishment law in order to ascertain the evolving standards of decency in an Eighth
Amendment case); Alford, supra note 125, at 60.
183. See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 320–21 (2d ed. 1979); Koh, supra note 97, at 56. This might eventually lead to the destabilization of international legal
regimes. Cf. Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the S.D. of
Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 567 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part) (“The final component
of a comity analysis is to consider if there is a course that furthers, rather than impedes,
the development of an ordered international system.”).
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lature—normally represent socially acceptable values.184 Unless we embrace a wholly cynical view of international law, the act of ratification
must be deemed to signal some degree of agreement with the object,
purpose and the contents of the norms enumerated in the ratified instruments.185 Courts invested, inter alia, with the task of constantly updating
constitutional texts in order to meet changing realities, new challenges
and emerging social perceptions, should take into account the espousal of
norms and values by treaty-ratifying agencies as important indicia of
contemporary standards of what the law should be.186 So, the ability of
courts to consider norms enshrined in international treaties while interpreting constitutional instruments might help to minimize conflicts between legally binding norms and societal values and may therefore increase legal harmony.
Finally, it should be noted that IHR treaties have the potential to enrich
domestic law since they often represent more progressive and enlightened approaches to human rights protection than constitutional instruments, sometimes drafted many decades or even centuries ago.187 Furthermore, they often provide more specific guidance on human rights
protection than comparable CL provisions. Learning from the experience
of other legal orders and societies also opens new horizons and introduces new perspectives which could improve the quality of judicial decision making.188 This potential for improvement of CL through invocation
of IHR law should also support a pro-incorporation strategy.189

184. See Slaight Commc’ns Inc. v. Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038, 1056–57 (Can.).
185. Cf. S v Makwanyane 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) para. 362 (S. Afr.) (Sachs, J.)
(“Reference in the Constitution to the role of public international law (sections 35(1) and
231) underlines our common adherence to internationally accepted principles.”).
186. See Hughlett, supra note 15, at 190.
187. See, e.g., Goldsmith, supra note 32, at 331 (“[S]ome of [the ICCPR] rights clearly
go further than US law.”); Hughlett, supra note 15, at 183 (“If the Constitution is not
interpreted to guarantee at least those individual freedoms protected by international consensus, the United States will fall far behind the rest of the world in the protection of
human rights.”); Neuman, supra note 6, at 87 (“In the United States, such reexamination
may be especially beneficial where doctrinal structures preserve vestiges of longvanished historical conditions.”). See also Henkin, Constitutionalism, supra note 5, at
394 (listing areas in which IHR law could contribute to U.S. CL).
188. Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 997 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Stephen
Breyer, Keynote Address, 97 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 265, 267 (2003); Knop, supra
note 35, at 532; Neuman, supra note 4, at 1898; Koh, supra note 97, at 56; Christenson,
supra note 86, at 11.
189. See Bradley, supra note 95, at 507 (noting that proponents of normative canons of
interpretation concede that the canons are “not policy neutral”).
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C. Cultural Objections to Internationalizing the Constitutional Discourse
Another set of objections derives from cultural and ideological animosity towards IHR standards. This set of objections may be grouped in two
categories: objections that IHR are not adaptable to local conditions, and
objections that domestic courts may be ill-equipped to apply IHR standards.
1. Suitability to Local Conditions
Cultural objections are sometimes related to parochial “we know best”
sentiments, which contest the wisdom of international regulation, especially its adaptability to local conditions.190 Indeed, domestic law is often
190. Justice Scalia expounded such objection in Thompson:
We must never forget that it is a Constitution for the United States of America
that we are expounding. The practices of other nations, particularly other democracies, can be relevant to determining whether a practice uniform among
our people is not merely a historical accident, but rather so ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’ that it occupies a place not merely in our mores but, text
permitting, in our Constitution as well. But where there is not first a settled
consensus among our own people, the views of other nations, however enlightened the Justices of this Court may think them to be, cannot be imposed upon
Americans through the Constitution. In the present case, therefore, the fact that
a majority of foreign nations would not impose capital punishment upon persons under 16 at the time of the crime is of no more relevance than the fact that
a majority of them would not impose capital punishment at all, or have standards of due process quite different from our own.
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 869 n.4 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted). See also Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1226 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 n.* (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“While
Congress, as a legislature, may wish to consider the actions of other nations on any issue
it likes, this Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence should not impose foreign moods,
fads, or fashions on Americans.”); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 325 (2002)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“For if it is evidence of a national consensus for which we are
looking, then the viewpoints of other countries simply are not relevant.”); id. at 347–48
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (characterizing court’s discussion of foreign nations’ treatment of sodomy as meaningless and dangerous dicta); McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1466. See also R. v. Keegstra, [1990]
3 S.C.R. 697, 702 (Can.) (McLachlin, J., dissenting) (“The provisions of the Charter,
though drawing on a political and social philosophy shared with other democratic societies, are uniquely Canadian. As a result, considerations may point, as they do in this case,
to a conclusion regarding a rights violation which is not necessarily in accord with those
international covenants.”). Similar views have been espoused by an Australian judge:
The provisions of the Constitution are not to be read in conformity with international law. It is an anachronistic error to believe that the Constitution, which
was drafted and adopted by the people of the colonies well before international

394

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 31:2

viewed as offering an apposite level of human rights protection. As a
result, recourse to the less-familiar system of international protection
might be viewed as a redundant gesture, entailing more potential risks of
diluting local standards than potential benefits for normative progress.191
Further, some have challenged the legitimacy of super-imposing IHR
law upon national constituencies,192 regarding such imposition as imperialistic193 and offensive to local traditions and moral tenets.194 The debate
about the appropriateness of resorting to international law could indeed
be framed in the language of identity politics, as a contest between cosmopolitan and communal visions of social life.195
Naturally, such cultural objections are harder to address than other
more pragmatic and doctrinal objections, as they pertain to deeply entrenched conventions and identities. Admittedly, attempts to reinforce the
status of IHR treaties could be contextualized as part of the reemergence
of cosmopolitan citizenship as a non-exclusive form of identity.196 So,
bodies such as the United Nations came into existence, should be regarded as
speaking to the international community. The Constitution is our fundamental
law, not a collection of principles amounting to the rights of man, to be read
and approved by people and institutions elsewhere. The approbation of nations
does not give our Constitution any force, nor does its absence deny it effect.
Such a consideration should, therefore, have no part to play in interpreting our
basic law.
Western Australia v. Ward (2002) 213 C.L.R. 1, 390–91 (Callinan, J., dissenting). See
also R v. Jefferies, [1994] 1 N.Z.L.R. 290, 299–300 (C.A.) (N.Z.) (“[T]here are obvious
differences in our legal and social history, differences in societies and cultures . . . . Jurisprudence in other jurisdictions provides valuable insights but can never be determinative
of New Zealand law.”).
191. See Simma et al., supra note 60, at 108; Alford, supra note 125, at 58 (“[A] robust
use of international sources could have the unintended consequence of undermining
rather than promoting numerous constitutional guarantees.”).
192. Alford, supra note 125, at 59. See Henkin, Constitutionalism, supra note 5, at 392
(discussing “unilateralist” strands in U.S. jurisprudence).
193. See BALAKRISHNAN RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW: DEVELOPMENT, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THIRD WORLD RESISTANCE 254 (2003).
194. See Spiro, supra note 62, at 2023.
195. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 95, at 523 (“The approach of the political branches
to the human rights treaties is, for better or worse, a rejection of internationalism.”).
196. Cf. Treaty on the European Union pmbl., Dec. 24, 2002, O.J. (C 325) 9
(“[R]esolved to implement a common foreign and security policy . . . thereby reinforcing
the European identity and its independence in order to promote peace, security and progress in Europe and in the world . . . .”). This essentially Kantian notion identifies crossborder ties, values and needs which constitute an apolitical community that exists independently of statal structures. Hence, according to writers such as Joseph Weiler, one
should speak nowadays of overlapping circles of identities rather than of a single exclusive or even dominant identity. JOSEPH H.H. WEILER, THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE 344–
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integration of IHR treaties into CL reflects a political choice, since it facilitates the conditions for harmonious co-existence of cosmopolitan and
national identities. The political act of treaty ratification, however, signifies the state’s residual power to control the pace and scope of the integration and multiple-identity building process.197 Once a state has ratified
an IHR treaty, it has arguably accepted its contents as reflecting both national and international values. In such circumstances, the cultural opposition to incorporation seems theoretically indefensible.
It must be conceded, nonetheless, that a persistent value gap between
international standards and domestic constituencies (elites and masses)—
notwithstanding the formal act of ratification—could generate political
pressures which might undermine the project of incorporating IHR law
into CL. One specific risk might be that even if domestic courts acknowledge the relevance of IHR law, they will construe it in an idiosyncratic manner, so as to conform to preexisting constitutional notions and
national agendas.198 This construction, in turn, might lead to multiple
interpretations of IHR law and threaten its unity. In the long run, however, incorporation involving the embrace of common norms across national boundaries is likely to narrow cultural and ideological gaps between domestic legal systems and international law. The increasing proc47 (1999). See also Michel Rosenfeld, Modern Constitutionalism as Interplay Between
Identity and Diversity, in CONSTITUTIONALISM, IDENTITY, DIFFERENCE AND LEGITIMACY:
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 3, 6 (Michel Rosenfeld ed., 1994); Paul S. Berman, The
Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 311, 322–23 (2002); Jeremy Waldron,
Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 751, 754
(1992). In a similar vein, Anne-Marie Slaughter has described national judges as involved
in a common judicial project, across national borders, and as possessing a common judicial identity. Slaughter, supra note 103, at 58–59. See also Hon. Gérard V. La Forest, The
Expanding Role of the Supreme Court of Canada in International Law Issues, 34 CAN.
Y.B. INT’L L. 89, 100–01 (1996) (“[I]t is important that, in dealing with interstate issues,
national courts fully perceive their role in the international order and national judges
adopt an international perspective.”); RICHARD A. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS
IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 72 (1964) (noting that “domestic courts must act as
agents of the international order”); Bradley, supra note 95, at 498–99 (discussing the socalled “internationalist conception” of the Charming Betsy canon); Neuman, supra note
4, at 1882–83; Koh, supra note 97, at 53–54.
197. See Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v. Teoh (1995) 183 C.L.R. 273,
305 (Austl.) (Gaudron, J.) (“[R]atification would tend to confirm the significance of the
right within our society.”). Still, it could be argued that global economic, political and
cultural forces impel states to participate in the aforementioned process, and that their
ability to control it is limited.
198. Cf. HCJ 785/87 Affo v. Commander of I.D.F. Forces in the Judea and Samaria
Region, [1988] IsrSC 42(2) 4 (holding that article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention
does not, despite of its clear language, prohibit individual deportations from an occupied
territory).
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ess of cross-fertilization between different national systems and between
national and international law in particular,199 would eventually exert
harmonizing pressures which tend to minimize culture gaps.
2. Lack of Judicial Familiarity with International Human Rights Law
Another distinctively cultural issue is judges’ lack of familiarity with
international law, particularly IHR law.200 The long-running marginalization of international law from legal education and judicial training programs, exacerbated no doubt by the growing complexity of both municipal and international law, has resulted in a considerable lack of expertise
among many (though certainly not all) members of the judiciary in the
substance and methodology of international law.201 Under these conditions, the hesitancy of judges to step outside the boundaries of their judicial expertise and introduce IHR norms into CL is understandable and
perhaps commendable given the dangers of incorrect application.202
Nevertheless, one could maintain that this objection amounts to a selffulfilling prophecy. The more courts refrain from invoking IHR treaties
in important cases, including, by necessity, cases raising significant CL
issues, the less judges will be motivated to familiarize themselves with
these instruments. In other words, the marginalization of IHR has a selfperpetuating quality which reflects upon legal education and legal practice. There are several ways to break this vicious cycle: legislators could
explicitly incorporate IHR treaties into CL; judges could lead the way
and develop more international law-friendly canons of interpretation;
academics could press for reform of legal education, etc. Most probably,
a combination of some of these measures, including special measures
designed to improve the fluency of judges in IHR law,203 would be necessary to effect a significant change. In all events, lack of familiarity
should encourage improved knowledge and not inertia. Still, it is sensible
to require that the introduction of IHR treaties into domestic law in gen-

199. This is sometimes referred to as the “transnational legal process.” Koh, supra note
97, at 56.
200. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 874–75; Henkin, supra note 6, at 199;
Simma et al., supra note 60, at 107.
201. Alford, supra note 125, at 64–65 (the U.S. Supreme Court lacks the “institutional
capacity” to apply international law systematically).
202. See Stephen J. Toope, Keynote Address: Canada and International Law, in
CANADIAN COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON
THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN CANADA 33, 36–37 (1999); Bayefsky, supra note 38, 316–23.
203. Kirby, supra note 89, at 13.
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eral, and into the politically sensitive domain of CL in particular, ought
to be undertaken with prudence.204
D. Political Reluctance to Empower IHR Law within the National
Legal System
Finally, one could identify unique political objections directed against
the incorporation of IHR treaty norms into CL. The inherent sensitivity
of many human rights issues, the political costs of reforming local arrangements in order to conform to international standards and the embarrassing implications of finding national authorities to be in violation of
IHR standards, all produce an inhospitable legal climate for promoting
IHR through judicial means. Special problems relate to the introduction
of economic, social and cultural human rights, as the implementation of
such rights often entails significant economic costs.205
Because IHR law introduces limitations upon the freedom of action of
governmental structures and presents courts with an additional yardstick
by which to measure the performance of the other branches of government, incorporation of IHR treaties into CL could put courts on a collision course with the executive and legislative branches.206 The fear that
judges might adopt interpretations of international law which diverge
from those adopted by other branches of government presents yet another
complication.207 Courts might therefore be understandably reluctant to
alienate the other branches of government and might refrain from invoking IHR standards altogether. This tendency might be encouraged by
perceptions of IHR as a highly politicized body of law seeking to impose
one set of values and interests (anti-hegemonic, anti-imperialistic, promarket economy, etc.),208 over competing values or interests which can
be viewed as no less legitimate. Domestic courts, whose intuitive loyalty
lies with their nation’s values and interests, might be loath to join international critics and legitimate such a disapproving discourse.209
204. For a variety of mostly justified methodological concerns, which ought to govern
international law analysis by domestic courts, see Ramsey, supra note 98.
205. See, e.g., Yoram Rabin & Yuval Shany, The Israeli Unfinished Constitutional
Revolution: Has the Time Come for Protecting Economic and Social Rights?, 37 ISR. L.
REV. 299 (2004).
206. Cf. Spiro, supra note 62, at 2015–16. See also Neuman, supra note 6, at 88–89
(“Entrenching positive human rights standards as constitutional interpretation . . . would
deprive the political branches of their authority to choose methods of treaty implementation, and would not be consistent with current constitutional understandings.”).
207. Cf. Jonathan Turley, Dualistic Values in an Age of International Legisprudence,
44 HASTINGS L.J. 185, 238 (1993).
208. See RAJAGOPAL, supra note 193, at 292.
209. See Christenson, supra note 86, at 6; Benvenisti, supra note 137, at 173–74.
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Once again, these criticisms of incorporation are ultimately unconvincing. First, as treaty ratification is undertaken by the non-judicial branches
of government, any criticism directed against the courts for implementing the obligations entered into by the other branches is unjustified. It
amounts to an attempt by the ratifying actors to shirk the domestic political costs of their actions on the international plane.210 In the same vein,
the costs of any embarrassment associated with a finding by domestic
courts of failure on the part of the state to respect its international obligations should not be attributed to the courts, but to the legislature or government agency responsible for the incompatible measure. In fact, by
enforcing international standards courts actually minimize international
criticism against the state.
Second, courts often face the unpopular task of introducing rule-of-law
constraints on the operations of the other branches of government.211 Inevitably, they sometimes need to rule against what some domestic actors
perceive to be the community interest.212 Still, the unpopularity of such
measures or their inherent potential for inter-branch conflict should not
deter courts from fulfilling their constitutional role. As a result, the nonjudicial branches of government can expect only limited support from the
judicial branch in their endeavors to evade the dictates of the rule of international law, by way of rejecting the implementation of the state’s
international obligations.213

210. Cf. Jaffer, supra note 125, at 1111 (arguing that Congress and not the courts
should pay the political costs for adopting incorporating legislation inconsistent with
international treaties); Kirby, supra note 89, at 16 (“Giving effect to international law . . .
does no more than give substance to the act which the executive government has taken.”).
But see Yoo, supra note 18, at 1979 (contending that direct judicial enforcement of international obligations “robs the President and Congress of the flexibility they might need in
conducting the nation’s foreign affairs”).
211. See Slaughter, supra note 103, at 64 (arguing that separation of powers considerations support putting additional curbs on the path of the executive). Justice Landau, of
Israel’s High Court of Justice, has remarked:
I regard myself here, as a person who must meet the obligation to rule in accordance with law in any matter properly brought before the court, knowing well
in advance that the general public would fail to pay attention to our legal reasoning, but only note the final outcome; this might adversely affect the status of
the court as an institution situated above divisive public conflicts. But what can
we do? This is our role and obligation as judges.
HCJ 390/79 Dawikat v. Gov’t of Israel, [1980] IsrSC 34(1) 1, 4 (Landau, J.) (unofficial
translation).
212. See Knop, supra note 35, at 532.
213. Cf. Christenson, supra note 18, at 240.
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Finally, in many democracies, courts serve as protectors of the constitution and guardians of human rights. Incorporation of IHR treaties into
CL, to the degree that they enhance the protection of human rights, promotes this vision of the role of courts in a democracy.214 Inevitably, this
is a political argument.215 This does not, however, necessarily detract
from its force since the political system in all of the surveyed countries is
a liberal democracy which promotes, or at least tolerates, judicial activism in the area of human rights. Moreover, as indicated above, the accession of states to IHR treaties signifies their political support of these very
same normative values.216
V. CONCLUSION: A CALL FOR EXPANDING THE PRESUMPTION OF
CONFORMITY TO CONSTITUTIONAL TEXTS
This Article has advanced a variety of policy considerations that support the incorporation of IHR law into CL from a domestic law perspective: limitation of unchecked judicial discretion, protection of the power
of the executive to conduct foreign policy, necessity of harmonizing domestic law with self-executing international norms, promotion of the desirable social values reflected in IHR norms, confirmation of an emerging cosmopolitan identity, minimization of international criticism, etc.
Still, from an international law perspective, the debate on the pros and
cons of incorporation is mostly academic. Under most IHR treaties,
states must incorporate some or all of the norms enumerated thereby into
their domestic law, including, as argued in Part I, into their CL. Surely,
the fact that international law—a system of law which binds the polity—
requires a certain outcome, ought to be considered a relevant factor by
the courts of the same polity.217
214. Strossen, supra note 6, at 806. Some writers have criticized the selective utilization of right-enhancing international standards, and have challenged internationalists to
accept “the bitter with the sweet.” See, e.g., Alford, supra note 125, at 67. However, the
nature of IHR law is such that it lays a “floor” for human rights protection, and not a
“ceiling.” The often invoked assertion that U.S. Constitutional law adopts higher human
rights standards in freedom of speech matters, and that harmonization of the First
Amendment with IHR law would, for instance, have a right-diluting effect, Ramsey, supra note 98, at 77, is problematic, as it fails to acknowledge the right-enhancing implications of prohibitions on hate speech.
215. DWORKIN, supra note 121, at 127.
216. Cf. In Re Pub. Serv. Employee Relations Act (Alta.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313, 349
(Can.) (Dickson, C.J., dissenting) (“The content of Canada’s international human rights
obligations is, in my view, an important indicia of the meaning of ‘the full benefit of the
Charter’s protection.’”).
217. Id. (“The general principles of constitutional interpretation require that these international obligations be a relevant and persuasive factor in Charter interpretation.”).
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The survey of the law and practice of six common law countries on the
incorporation of IHR treaties into their CL, undertaken in Part II, suggests that most of them fail to meet the required standard of incorporation. In practice, resort to IHR treaties in the course of interpreting CL
instruments is discretionary and haphazard. Further, even when mentioned, IHR treaties are usually addressed within a weak “comparative
law” framework, and not under a stronger presumption of conformity.
Therefore, a legal reform is needed in order to solidify the influence of
IHR treaties upon the CL of the surveyed common law countries. The
most natural basis for introducing such a reform is the development of a
coherent judicial canon of constitutional interpretation.218 This legal tactic does not require constitutional or legislative amendments and can be
applied under existing law. It draws its legitimacy from the inherent
power of the judiciary to construe constitutional instruments and to resort
to all relevant materials that could facilitate this endeavor.219
An important methodological question that needs to be explored in this
regard is whether it is desirable to link the incorporation of IHR treaties
into CL to the long-standing presumption of conformity doctrine. Arguably, such linkage could improve the legitimacy of the discussed interpretive strategy because all of the surveyed legal systems recognize and apply the presumption with regard to primary legislation.220 It would also
offer judges a body of precedents concerning the incorporation of international law into domestic law.
218. Lillich, supra note 18, at 78 (“[T]aking advantage of this ‘indirect incorporation’
approach seems to be a sensible strategy for human rights lawyers and a wise policy for
United States courts concerned with developing the promising relationship between the
United States Constitution and international human rights law.”); Hughlett, supra note
15, at 174; Connie de la Vega, Comments, 18 INT’L LAW. 69, 69 (1984); Spiro, supra
note 62, at 2025–26. See also Harry A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of
Nations, 104 YALE L.J. 39, 45 (1994) (“International law can and should inform the interpretation of various clauses of the Constitution . . . .”).
219. Cf. Roger A. Silver, The Inherent Power of the Florida Courts, 39 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 257, 261–62 (1985) (discussing the origins of the courts’ inherent power to interpret
the Constitution). Interestingly enough, in both Canada and Australia, judges that resorted
to IHR treaties law in order to promote specific constitutional interpretations, did not see
a potential constitutional problem in expanding the scope of possible interpretative aids.
See Slaight Commc’ns Inc. v. Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038, 1056–57 (Dickson, C.J.)
(Can.); Kartinyeri v. Commonwealth (1998) 195 C.L.R. 337 (Austl.). Cf. Charles Fried,
Scholars and Judges: Reason and Power, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 807, 818–19
(2000) (discussing the consequences of Justice Breyer’s insertion of comparative constitutional law materials in a judicial opinion).
220. Cf. Bradley, supra note 95, at 533 (“[T]he long-standing existence of the canon,
without a reaction from the political branches, may suggest some sort of acquiescence
that further reduces the separation of powers problem.”).
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Interestingly, however, those judges who have resorted to IHR treaties
as sources of constitutional interpretation have not explicitly created such
linkage.221 This can probably be explained by reference to the limits the
presumption of conformity imposes upon judicial discretion. According
to the presumption, courts should construe domestic law in a manner
consistent with the state’s international obligations. It may be assumed
that even pro-incorporation judges felt that in the field of CL, where the
constitutional stakes are particularly high, such a rigid formulation might
be politically untenable. The question is thus whether the doctrine can
accommodate the particular sensitivities of CL and allow for some flexibility in its application, or whether it should be excluded from the purview of CL altogether.
Analysis of the traditional rationales offered for applying the presumption of conformity divulges legal policy choices that might be more complicated than apparent at first glance, a fact that might bear upon the
willingness to employ the doctrine in the context of CL. The presumption
is normally premised upon a legislative intent theory, according to which
it can never be presumed that legislators had intended to place their
country in breach of its international obligations. Hence, only explicit
legislative language can justify overruling IHR treaty norms. Although
the presumption is based upon a legal fiction, as legislators often do not
consider the effect of legislative measures upon international law and are
arguably less concerned about international obligations than the presumption supposes,222 the presumption could, over time, create a selffulfilling prophecy.223 The mere knowledge that courts apply such a presumption induces legislators to consider its potential effect upon the interpretation of legislation and to select, where necessary, explicit language overriding the international obligations of the polity. Thus, as the
interplay between international and national law becomes more and more
visible, the theory of legislative intent becomes less and less fictional.
Nevertheless, this development has little or no bearing on CL instruments. Sometimes, such instruments were concluded before the presumption was even enunciated. In all events, given the uncertainties regarding
221. An exception could be found in the dicta adopted by Judge Mahomed of the South
African Constitutional Court. See Azanian Peoples Org. (AZAPO) v President of the Republic of S. Afr. 1996 (8) BCLR 1015 (CC) para. 26 (Mahomed, J.) (“[T]he lawmakers of
the Constitution should not lightly be presumed to authorise any law which might constitute a breach of the obligations of the State in terms of international law.”).
222. See Bradley, supra note 95, at 522 (noting that as an empirical matter, the claim
that the political branches wish to comply with international law may be suspect, especially with respect to new international customary law).
223. Id. at 497.
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the status of international law on the constitutional sphere, it is more
likely than not that the drafters of constitutional instruments were unaware that the presumption might apply vis-à-vis their brainchild.224 The
infrequency of constitutional amendment procedures further reduces the
chances of factoring in the effects of international law. In short, the fictitiousness of the presumption is more apparent in relation to constitutional
instruments than to ordinary legislation. The problematic legitimacy of
relying upon drafter intent theories as part of the CL discourse could justify, from a domestic law perspective, caution in the application of the
presumption of conformity to CL instruments.
Another important concern is the relationship between the presumption
of conformity and other interpretive presumptions. All systems surveyed
in this Article do not apply the presumption to the exclusion of other
rules of interpretation. On the contrary, other rules of construction are
regularly applied.225 Hence, even if the presumption is to be applied at
the CL level, it may not exclude the application of other canons of interpretation designed to protect fundamental constitutional values (such as
federal organizing principles, separation of powers, etc.);226 nor can it
override the clear meaning of the constitutional text.227 While from an
international law perspective this outcome might be unacceptable (as it
might result in non-compliance with IHR norms), it would meet the concerns of legal systems which view compliance with international law as
merely one among numerous competing systematic values.228

224. But see Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 132–33 (1923) (Sutherland, J.,
dissenting) (“It does not seem possible to me that Congress, in submitting the Amendment or the several States in adopting it, could have intended to vest in the various seaboard States a power so intimately connected with our foreign relations and whose exercise might result in international confusion and embarrassment.”).
225. See, for example, the presumption that legislation should be construed in a manner which does not raise serious constitutional problems. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289,
299–300 (2001); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932); United States v. Del. &
Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 407 (1909). See also supra note 76.
226. Cf. Neuman, supra note 6, at 88.
227. See Kartinyeri v. Commonwealth (1998) 195 C.L.R. 337, 418 (Austl.) (Kirby, J.,
dissenting) (“There is no doubt that, if the constitutional provision is clear and if a law is
clearly within power, no rule of international law, and no treaty (including one to which
Australia is a party) may override the Constitution or any law validly made under it.”).
228. See Hughlett, supra note 15, at 188 (“[I]nternational law should be only one interpretive tool used by the courts, and the courts should not apply international law when
the application is inconsistent with the result of all other interpretive approaches.”). Cf.
Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950)
(“[T]here are two opposing canons on almost every point.”); Simma et al., supra note 60,
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Therefore, if the presumption of conformity is to apply to CL, it should
be applied with caution and deference to other constitutional doctrines as
well as sensitivity to the needs and concerns of domestic legal systems.
Nevertheless, a number of reasons justify resort to the presumption in the
course of CL interpretation. First, resort to a presumption of conformity
underscores the international obligation to comply with IHR treaties and
has, as a result, important symbolic value. Second, considerations of legitimacy and stability support the incorporation of IHR into CL in the
context of the well-accepted presumption of conformity. Courts would
therefore be able to build upon existing practice in the field of statutory
construction when harmonizing CL and IHR treaties. Finally, the presumption is sufficiently flexible to accommodate the necessary degrees
of caution and sensitivity, as well as the protection of other constitutional
values.
While my position might also accommodate incorporation into CL of
non-IHR international obligations through interpretive means, there are
unique policy arguments supporting integration of IHR norms. Most importantly, IHR law has intellectual and historical affinity to CL. Second,
IHR instruments impose an explicit or implicit duty to incorporate.
Hence, a stronger presumption of conformity is apposite in relation to
IHR treaties.
The proposed approach may be summarized as follows. Explicitly or
implicitly, IHR treaties require states to bring domestic law into conformity with the human rights norms enunciated by them. This requirement
also applies at the CL level. As a number of civil and common law countries have adopted such an approach (e.g., Canada and Germany),229 it is

at 95 (“[T]he limits of constitutional interpretation . . . still define a borderline beyond
which divergent international human rights standards may not be considered.”).
229. It can be noted that several attempts have been made in recent years at the international level to call upon national courts to adopt a more hospitable attitude towards the
utilization of IHR treaties when construing national law, including CL. For example, in
1998, a high-level meeting of members of the judiciary from Commonwealth and South
Asian countries convened in Bangalore and issued a joint proclamation asserting that:
It is the vital duty of an independent, impartial and well-qualified judiciary, assisted by an independent, well-trained legal profession, to interpret and apply
national constitutions and ordinary legislation in harmony with international
human rights codes and customary international law, and to develop the common law in the light of the values and principles enshrined in international human rights law.
Concluding Statement Issued by Participants at the Judicial Colloquium on the Domestic
Implementation of International Human Rights Norms (Dec. 30, 1998), http://www.
apwld.org/vol122-02.htm. The joint proclamation issued ten years earlier stated:
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hard to contend that this represents an unrealistic threshold of compliance with international standards. In most common law legal systems,
this outcome could be largely achieved through the development of canons of CL interpretation by the domestic judiciary à la the presumption
of conformity applicable to statutory construction. Although these proposals are hardly revolutionary, they could encourage courts to take IHR
law more seriously and to improve the level of human rights protection
under domestic law.

It is within the proper nature of the judicial process and well-established judicial functions for national courts to have regard to international obligations
which a country undertakes—whether or not they have been incorporated into
domestic law—for the purpose of removing ambiguity or uncertainty from, national constitutions, legislation or common law.
Concluding Statement of the Judicial Colloquium Held in Bangalore, India from 24–26
February 1988, 62 AUST. L.J. 531, para. 7 (1988). While sources such as the Bangalore
Statement are clearly aspirational in nature, they do suggest that there is a growing
awareness of the importance of incorporating IHR treaties into CL instruments.

